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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PROBLEMS OF PERMITTING EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT*

I. INTRODUCTION
The main advantage of the arbitration process is that it allows parties to
settle their disputes without having to resort to courts. Permitting parties to
contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards would take away
this advantage by allowing a party back into court for a “second bite at the
apple.” Generally, parties to an arbitration agreement are trying to avoid the
costs and delays inherent in the court system. These goals are abandoned by
expanded judicial review. A clause in an arbitration agreement expanding
judicial review of awards would place the dispute into the litigation process,
resulting in parties seeking efficient dispute resolution to “[a]bandon hope, all
ye who enter here,”1 when faced with arbitration with expanded court review.
Arbitration is defined by the Dictionary of Conflict Resolution as:
[A] term for a range of dispute resolution processes involving the referral of a
dispute to an impartial third party who, after giving the parties an opportunity
to present their evidence and arguments renders a determination in settlement
of the dispute . . . [and] is characterized as an informal, inexpensive, fast, and
private adjudicative process that may consider custom as well as principles of
fairness and equity to reach an outcome that is final and subject to very limited
appeal.2

Arbitration may be best described as a “creature of contract.”3 Parties in
federal court, who have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, are
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act4 (hereinafter referred to as the “FAA”
or “Act”). A valid and enforceable arbitration agreement has the effect of
“oust[ing]” a court of its jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.5 Arbitration, as a

* This Comment, by Kevin A. Sullivan, was selected as the Best Student Work to appear in
Volume 46 of the Saint Louis University Law Journal.
1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 5 (Lawrence Grant White trans., Pantheon
Books 1948).
2. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28, 33 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999).
3. U.S. Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan J.,
concurring).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
5. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 987 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
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whole, is an important function of the law at the turn of the second millennium
as more and more parties agree to arbitrate in areas such as general commercial
disputes, employment disputes, securities laws and even consumer purchases,
to name just a few.
In June 2001, a split among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
developed over the issue of whether parties to an arbitration agreement could
agree to federal court appellate review of an arbitration award in federal court
beyond the level of review Congress set forth in the FAA.6 A clause
expanding judicial review of an award may be as simple as giving either party
the right to appeal an award in district court “on the grounds that the award is
not supported by the evidence,”7 may provide for de novo review for “errors or
law,”8 or may do both and set out the specific scope of review.9 The Tenth
Circuit held parties are not permitted to expand the scope of review beyond the
tenets of the Act.10 This position departs from that of the Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, which have held that parties can contract for expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards.11 This conflict between the Circuits centers on
two countervailing policies: on the one hand, the FAA’s guarantee of
enforcement of arbitration agreements by the courts according to the terms of
the parties’ agreement12 and, on the other hand, the policy that parties cannot,
by contract, alter the way that the courts review arbitration awards.13
This Comment will explore the courts’ reasoning in endorsing or rejecting
the expanded review of arbitration awards and will ultimately conclude that
parties should not be permitted to expand judicial review of arbitration awards
beyond the grounds for vacating or modifying awards under the FAA.14 Part II
will describe how the Act operates and the reasons behind its enactment.
Special attention will be given to the grounds for vacating or modifying
awards. Part III will provide an overview of pertinent Supreme Court cases
dealing with aspects of the FAA with an eye towards how the Supreme Court
might rule on the issue of expanded judicial review of arbitration awards. Part
IV is divided into two subparts. Subpart A will examine the evolution of the
courts allowing expanded judicial review through an analysis of In re Fils Et
6. See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001); LaPine Tech.
Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1997).
7. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
8. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1995).
9. For examples of possible clauses permitting expanded judicial review of awards, see
Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error—An Option to Consider,
Appendix B, Other Provisions Permitting Appellate Review of Arbitration Awards, 13 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 124 (1997).
10. Bowen, 254 F.3d 925.
11. See, e.g., Gateway, 64 F.3d 993; LaPine, 130 F.3d 884.
12. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888.
13. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933.
14. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994).
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Cables D’Acier de Lens,15 Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.,16 Syncor International Corp. v. McLeland17 and
LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.18 Subpart B will analyze Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co.19 and the opinions upon which the Bowen court relied in
rejecting expanded judicial review.20 Part V presents an argument for rejecting
party-created expansion of judicial review on two grounds: first, that expansion
of judicial review will threaten the integrity of the arbitration process because
the additional costs and delays inherent in the court system will lead to
arbitration becoming just another rung on the ladder of federal court litigation
and, second, that parties cannot alter the process of federal court adjudication
solely by their agreement and without express Congressional assent. Part VI
will conclude with an overview of the arguments against expansion of judicial
review and give some alternatives to purely accepting or rejecting expanded
judicial review.
II. THE FAA AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The primary aim of the enactment of the FAA in 1925 was to “overcome
courts’ refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”21 The legislative history of
the Act focuses on two benefits derived from it: the enforceability of
arbitration agreements and the desirability of arbitration. According to the
House Judiciary Committee Report, the Act was to “declare[] simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the
Federal courts for their enforcement.”22 Congressman Graham expressed the
opinion that the proposed bill neither created new legislation nor granted new
rights, but provided a remedy for parties to enforce “that which they have
already agreed to.”23 Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, sent a
letter to the judiciary committees urging that the Act was needed due to the

15. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (endorsing, for the first time, expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards pursuant to the parties’ agreement). See Part IV.A.1 infra for a full
discussion of the case.
16. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995). See infra Part IV.A.2 for a full discussion of the case.
17. 120 F.3d 262, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished
table case). See infra Part IV.A.3 for a full discussion of the case.
18. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997). See infra Part IV.A.4 for a full discussion of the case.
19. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001). See infra Part IV.B.1 for a full discussion of the case.
20. See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501
(7th Cir. 1991); UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998). See
infra Part IV.B.2 for a full discussion of these cases.
21. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1-2 (1924), reprinted in IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW 98 (1992).
23. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924), reprinted in MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 98.
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“clogging of our courts.”24 Congressman Dyer felt the Act would “do away
with a lot of expensive litigation.”25 The House Committee Report further
stated that the “costliness and delays of litigation . . . can be largely eliminated
by agreements for arbitration, if [such] agreements are made valid and
Amazingly, because of the courts’ hostility towards
enforceable.”26
arbitration, there was no opposition to the proposed FAA.27 In fact, the Act
and its amendments passed easily in both Houses of Congress and were signed
into law by President Coolidge on February 12, 1925.28
As to any legislative history available to shed light on the drafters’ intent
regarding judicial review of awards, there is none. Professor Sarah Cole has
posited that the drafters of the FAA did not think “parties would ever be
interested in expanding judicial review of arbitration awards.”29 Professor
Cole found that the lack of a discussion in the legislative history of judicial
review meant Congress “intended to codify the common law, which limited
review to examination of the arbitral award for procedural irregularities.”30
A.

Application of the FAA

The FAA sections discussed in this Part of the Comment will give a brief
overview of how the Act operates and how difficult it is for a party to gain
vacatur or modification under the FAA. The main focus, however, will be on
section 10, wherein Congress gave the grounds for vacating an arbitration
award.31
Section 2 of the FAA provides that a “written provision” or “an agreement
in writing” to settle a dispute arising out of a contract or “transaction . . . shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”32 For example, an arbitration

24. Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of
Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime transactions, or Commerce Among the States or
Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S.1005 and H.R. 646 Before the
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 21 (1924), reprinted in MACNEIL,
supra note 22, at 92.
25. 65 CONG. REC. H11081 (1924), reprinted in MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 101. In Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953), the Supreme Court found that the Congressional reports on
the FAA “stress the need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation . . . .”
26. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 2 (1924), reprinted in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 220 (1985).
27. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 115 (1992).
28. Id. at 101.
29. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1255 (2000).
30. Id.
31. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (“Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
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agreement is void and unenforceable if there is a lack of “mutual obligation to
arbitrate.”33 Section 2 has been held to be “a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” creating “a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement
within the coverage of the Act.”34 Therefore, a party must satisfy section 2 if it
hopes to compel arbitration or to confirm, vacate or modify an award.
If one party has already filed an action in a federal district court, section 3
of the FAA permits a party seeking arbitration to apply for a stay of the action
in the court until arbitration is completed pursuant to the parties’ agreement.35
The district court must simply be “satisfied that the issue involved in such suit
or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement . . . .”36 In
effect, the granting of the stay takes the dispute out of the hands of the court
and places it into the hands of an arbitrator.37
Section 4 of the FAA sets forth the procedural requirements a party must
meet to have a federal district court compel arbitration.38 If one party fails or
refuses to arbitrate, the aggrieved party can petition any district court having
jurisdiction (through either diversity or federal question), unless a court is
agreed upon on in the arbitration agreement, for an order directing the noncomplying party to submit to arbitration.39 At this stage, the non-complying
party has the opportunity to prove that the arbitration agreement is not valid or

agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that
would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)).
33. Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit held
“that the consideration exchanged for one party’s promise to arbitrate must be the other party’s
promise to arbitrate at least some specified class of claims. Mere presence of an arbitration clause
is insufficient to enforce the arbitration agreement.” Id. at 1550.
34. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The
Court further stated: “The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. at 24-5. Moses H. Cone is discussed further infra
Part III.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). See Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, 713
F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1983). In Contracting Northwest, the Eighth Circuit held that “the district
court [has] the inherent power to grant the stay in order to control its docket, conserve judicial
resources, and provide for a just determination of the cases pending before it . . . .” Id. at 387
(citing Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Vecco Concrete Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 961, 964 (4th Cir.
1980)).
36. § 3.
37. However, the dispute can easily be brought back into the district court after the
arbitration is completed if the party prevailing at arbitration seeks confirmation of the award, if
the losing party seeks vacatur of the award or if either party seeks modification or correction of
the award. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1994). Each of these sections will be discussed infra Part II.B.
38. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
39. See id.
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that it is not in default of the agreement and can even request that a jury decide
the issue.40 If the court, or jury if one is demanded, finds that the agreement to
arbitrate is valid, the court will order an arbitration to proceed “in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.”41 In interpreting an arbitration agreement,
“due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration” and any
ambiguities in the arbitration clause are to be “resolved in favor of
arbitration.”42 The FAA requires the compelling of arbitration, even if the
result would be an “inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in
different forums.”43
Section 5 of the Act allows a party, in the absence of a method for
choosing an arbitrator in the parties’ agreement or if the parties fail to name an
arbitrator, to apply to a court for the naming of an arbitrator.44 Unless stated
otherwise in the parties’ agreement, a single arbitrator will preside over the
arbitration.45
Section 9 of the Act states that a party, upon a final entry of an arbitration
award, may petition a district court to enter judgment on the award within one
year of the date of the award.46 This confirmation mechanism operates only if
the parties have expressly stated in their agreement that a judgment is to be
entered on the arbitrator’s award.47 The court must confirm the award and
enter judgment on it “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
proscribed in sections 10 and 11 of [the Act].”48 A straight-forward
interpretation of the language in section 9 leads to the conclusion that a party
opposing confirmation of an award must challenge the award through the
machinery for vacatur, modification or correction as provided in sections 10
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989).
43. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985). In Byrd, the Supreme
Court rejected the approach taken by the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits when faced with the
situation in which a party seeks to compel arbitration of a pendent state law claim, while a federal
court would still have jurisdiction over a federal law claim. Id. at 216. These Circuits held that
federal district courts could use discretion in “deny[ing] arbitration as to the arbitration claims
and try all the claims together in federal court” if the “arbitrable [state] and nonarbitrable [federal]
claims arise out the same transaction, and are sufficiently intertwined factually and legally.” Id.
at 216-17. The Byrd Court reversed the decision of the district court and court of appeals that
applied this doctrine in refusing to compel arbitration of the pendent state claims. Id. at 223-24.
44. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
45. Id.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994). See Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d
Cir. 1980) (“[A] district court is without authority to review the validity of arbitrators’ rulings
prior to the making of an award. Where . . . arbitrators make an interim ruling that does not
purport to resolve finally the issues submitted to them, judicial review is unavailable.”).
47. § 9.
48. Id. The confirmation can be entered in a court specified by the parties. Id.
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and 11 of the FAA. Courts have varying interpretations about how parties can
invoke section 9, the main issue being whether express language is needed or if
the agreement for confirmation can be implied by a “final and binding” term.49
Section 11 of the Act allows an aggrieved party to apply to the district
court in the district where the arbitration award was granted for an order
modifying or correcting the award to “promote justice between the parties.”50
As with section 10, the grounds for modification or correction are very limited
in scope.51 The first ground is where an arbitrator miscalculates figures in the
award or makes a material mistake in describing “any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award.”52 One example of an arbitrator’s
miscalculation leading to court modification is where “an arbitration award
orders a party to pay damages that have already been paid or which are
included elsewhere in the award . . . .”53 The second and third grounds are
where the arbitrator makes an award on “a matter not submitted to them” or the
arbitrator’s “award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.”54 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has warned that “[§]
11 . . . is limited . . . [and] does not license the district court to substitute its
judgment for that of the arbitrators.”55
Section 16 of the FAA is a catchall authorizing parties to appeal a court
order regarding refusal of a stay (§ 3), denying a petition to compel (§ 4), and
confirming (or refusing to confirm) (§ 9), modifying (§ 11), or vacating (§ 10)
an award.56 Section 16 prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order

49. Erika Van Ausdall, Confirmation of Arbitral Awards: The Confusion Surrounding
Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 41, 47-48 (2000).
50. 9 U.S.C. §11 (1994).
51. Section 10 of the Act is discussed infra Part II.B.
52. § 11(a).
53. Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994). In Eljer Mfg.,
two corporations entered into joint venture requiring a $2,500,000 loan for which each entity
guaranteed $1,250,000. Id. at 1252. After the joint venture failed and arbitration ensued, the
arbitrator included in his award to the prevailing party the entire amount of the loan ($2,500,000)
even though the losing party had already repaid the loan to the bank. Id. at 1253. The entire
amount of the loan was included again in the award to calculate the amount the losing party had
been unjustly enriched. Id.
54. § 11(b)-(c). However, the award will not be modified if “it is a matter not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.” Id. § 11(b).
55. Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980). The dispute
in Diapulse arose out of a distributor agreement between American and Swiss companies. Id. at
1109. The American company demanded arbitration alleging that the Swiss company violated a
non-compete clause in the agreement. Id. The arbitration award enjoined the Swiss company
from competing with the American company, but the district court found that the award violated
public policy in restraining trade and modified the award by limiting the injunction in time and
geographic area. Id. at 1110. The Second Circuit held that the district court erred by modifying
the award in this manner. Id.
56. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
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granting a stay, compelling arbitration or “refusing to enjoin an arbitration that
is subject to this title.”57
B.

Statutory Grounds for Vacating Arbitration Awards58

In essence, expanded judicial review of an award is a license for a court to
vacate or modify an award pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement.
The traditional forms of vacatur are found in the FAA.59 Additionally, there
exist several grounds outside of the Act created by the judiciary. Section 10 of
the FAA is at the heart of the controversy over whether parties may
contractually expand federal judicial review of arbitration awards. A party to
the arbitration can apply to the court “in and for the district wherein the award
was made” for an order vacating the award on four separate grounds.60 Where
an arbitration award is vacated on these grounds, the court has the option to
remand the matter to an arbitrator for rehearing.61
The first ground is “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.”62 Vacatur on this ground is difficult to obtain. For example, to
vacate an award due to fraud, the challenging party must show that due
diligence prior to the arbitration would not have uncovered the fraud, that the
fraud was a material issue, and establish by “clear and convincing evidence”
that there was a fraud.63
The second ground is “evident partiality or corruption” on the part of an
arbitrator.64 One example of the application of this ground is a Supreme Court
decision which held that an arbitrator’s failure to disclose to a party that he had
a long financial relationship with the opposing party was “‘evident partiality’”
or even “‘undue means’” and ordered vacatur.65 Another example of “evident

57. Id.
58. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996), for an in-depth discussion of the
grounds for vacating a commercial arbitration award.
59. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
60. Id. § 10(a).
61. Id. § 10(a)(5).
62. Id. § 10(a)(1).
63. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam). In McCollough, the district court rejected the investors’ claim that the award was the
result of a fraud because the brokerage firm raised “meritless defenses,” which knowingly
misstated the law. Id. at 1402, 1404. See also Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1986)
(“The party asserting fraud must establish it by clear and convincing evidence . . . and must show
that due diligence could not have resulted in discovery of the fraud prior to arbitration.”).
64. Id. § 10(a)(2).
65. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). In
Commonwealth Coatings, the arbitrator who was found to be evidently partial was an engineering
consultant who had rendered services to one of the parties over four or five years and been paid
$12,000 over that period. Id. at 146. See also Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council
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partiality” was found in a case where the arbitrator reduced the loss
documented by one party by ninety-five percent without any basis for the
reduction in the facts.66
The third ground for vacatur under section 10 of the Act is where the
arbitrators are guilty of “misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing . . . or
in refusing to hear” pertinent and material evidence or “any other misbehavior”
resulting in a party’s rights being prejudiced.67 An award may only be
overturned if an arbitrator suppressed evidence that was decisive in light of the
case or which resulted in serious harm, not merely if the suppression was an
error of law.68 One illustration of arbitrator misconduct is when an arbitrator
refused to adjourn a hearing because of the sudden illness of a key
representative of a party.69 Professor Stephen Hayford has stated that “in
absence of substantial, direct proof that one or more of the types of misconduct
addressed in [the first three grounds] has transpired, coupled with a

Carpenters Benefits Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that “evident partiality” was
present where the arbitrator was the son of a vice president of the union which was a party in the
dispute). Nonetheless, the Second Circuit refined the “evident partiality” standard in hopes of
avoiding an expansive application of it, by stating:
[W]e read Section [10(a)(2)] as requiring . . . more than the mere “appearance of
bias” to vacate an arbitration award. . . . [W]e hold that “evident partiality” within the
meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10 will be found where a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.
Id. at 83-84.
66. Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 658 F. Supp. 576, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The
Court . . . is unable to infer a ground for arbitrators’ decision from the facts of this case. . . .
Under these circumstances, reduction of the amount of the award by ninety-five percent can only
represent ‘evident partiality’ on the part of the arbitrators towards Merrill Lynch.”).
67. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (1994).
68. Newark Stereotypers’ Union v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir.
1968). The union, in Newark Stereotypers’ Union, sought vacatur because the arbitrators refused
to consider evidence that its expert witness had been intimidated into not testifying by the other
party. Id. at 596. The district court refused vacatur of the award and the appellate court affirmed
because the union’s claim of intimidation “was peripheral to the issue of fact which was before
the arbitrators for decision.” Id. at 600. See also Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. The
Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that “an award will not be
vacated even though the arbitrator may have made, in the eyes of judges, errors of fact and law
unless it ‘compels the violation of law or conduct contrary to public policy’”) (quoting Gulf
States Tel. Co. v. Local 1692, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1969)).
69. Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Local 1115 Joint Board, 377 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-13
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Allendale Nursing Home, the arbitrator refused to adjourn the proceeding
after an employer’s representative became visibly ill at the arbitration, raising even the
arbitrator’s concern, and requiring her to be hospitalized. Id. at 1212. The district court vacated
the award and remanded the dispute to arbitration because it found the arbitrator’s refusal to be an
abuse of discretion when the representative was important to the employer’s case. Id. at 1214.
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demonstrated link between that untoward behavior and the challenged arbitral
result, the prospects for vacatur of the arbitration award are doubtful.”70
The fourth ground for vacatur is “[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that” a true award on the matter
submitted “was not made.”71 An example of a situation where a court will
vacate an award due to arbitrators exceeding their authority is when the award
included punitive damages when the parties’ agreement did not permit the
awarding of them.72 Another example is where an arbitrator exceeds his
authority by deciding issues and rights of parties not submitted to him by the
parties.73 Courts have rejected several grounds for vacatur lying outside of the
FAA simply because they were not specifically included in the Act,
particularly: lack of proper notice of the arbitration,74 the failure of an
arbitrator to explain the reasoning of an award75 or an arbitrator’s faulty factfinding or errors of law.76 Courts will also not allow a party to collaterally

70. Hayford, supra note 58, at 749.
71. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
72. See Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since
the arbitrators were not entitled to award punitive damages due to the choice-of-law provision in
the parties’ Agreement, it is manifest that the Panel exceeded its authority in awarding punitive
damages.”).
73. See NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co, Inc., 43 F.3d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 1995). In NCR, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed vacatur of an award that awarded punitive damages not just to the dealer who
brought the claim, but to all of the manufacturer’s dealers throughout the country. Id. at 1078.
The court held “the arbitrator exceeded his authority by resolving a dispute which may or may not
have existed between [the manufacturer] and its other nonservicing dealers, and by determining
the rights of individuals who were not parties in the arbitration proceedings.” Id. at 1080.
74. See Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have repeatedly
held that 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides the exclusive grounds for setting aside an arbitration award
under the FAA. Inadequate notice is not one of these grounds, and the [challenging party’s]
claim therefore fails.”).
75. See In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211, 1211, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972) (“We hold that in the
circumstances of this case the arbitrators have no such obligation to explain their award. . . .
[F]orcing arbitrators to explain their award even when grounds for it can be gleaned from the
record will unjustifiably diminish whatever efficiency [arbitration] now achieves.”). See also
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986). In Stroh Container, the
award contained a discussion of the issues, but the arbitrators did not outline the laws they used
nor did they describe their reasoning or analysis. Id. at 750. In affirming the district court’s
refusal to vacate, the Eighth Circuit held: “Arbitrators are not required to elaborate their reasoning
supporting an award . . . and to allow a court to conclude that it may substitute its own judgment
for the arbitrator’s whenever the arbitrator chooses not to explain the award would improperly
subvert the proper functioning of the arbitral process. . . . “ Id.
76. See Office of Supply Gov’t of the Republic of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d
377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (“An award will not be set aside because of an error on the part of the
arbitrators in their interpretation of the law.”). See also San Martine Compania de Navegacion,
S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he statutory grounds
for vacating or modifying the award of arbitrators are stated in [§§ 10 and 11 of the FAA] and
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attack an arbitration award by filing a separate lawsuit or seeking another
arbitration, leaving the grounds for the challenging an award firmly within
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.77
Numerous courts have acknowledged that the review of arbitration awards
are extremely limited and “among the narrowest known to the law.”78 An
arbitration award is not subject to review except for the grounds set out in
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA and the deference to these awards almost
approach the deference “given to a jury decision.”79
C. Judicially Created Grounds for Vacating Awards
Several federal circuit courts have created further grounds for vacating
arbitration awards beyond section 10 of the FAA. These include the manifest
disregard of the law standard, the “completely irrational” or “arbitrary and
neither section authorizes the setting aside of an award ‘on grounds of erroneous finding of fact or
misinterpretation of law.’”).
77. See, e.g., Decker v. Merrill Lynch, 205 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2000). In Decker, an
aggrieved investor who lost at arbitration filed a lawsuit and a second claim for arbitration
alleging that the brokerage firm “improperly interfered with the arbitration.” Id. at 907. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit and the injunction against arbitration finding
that the investor’s “claims collaterally attack the arbitration award and the FAA provides the
exclusive remedy for challenging acts that taint an arbitration award.” Id. at 908. See also Corey
v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) (“To allow a collateral attack
against arbitrators and their judgments would also emasculate the appeal provisions of the
[FAA].”).
78. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting ARW
Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1995)); Richmond, Fredricksburg &
Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Communications Int’l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978)). See also First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding that courts should set aside arbitrator
awards only in the narrow circumstances of § 10); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs.,
Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The grounds on which the plaintiffs can attack the
award are limited to those set forth in the [FAA].”); Bavarati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28
F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The grounds for setting aside arbitration awards are exhaustively
stated in the [FAA].”); Mosely, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 267
(7th Cir. 1988) (“Sections 10 and 11 of the Act set forth the exclusive grounds for vacating or
modifying a commercial arbitration award.”); John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Sys., Inc., 623
F.2d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1980) (courts generally refuse to second guess arbitration awards and
accord “the narrowest of reading to [the Act’s] authorization to vacate awards”); Gingiss Int’l,
Inc., 58 F.3d at 332 (FAA § 10(a) gives the exclusive grounds for vacating an award); Barbier v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 120 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“It is well settled that judicial
review of an arbitration award is narrowly limited.”); Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 41-42 (10th
Cir. 1986) (“The [FAA] provides the exclusive remedy for challenging conduct that taints an
arbitration award within the Act’s coverage.”).
79. 2 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 16-21
(3d ed. 1999). But see Corey, 691 F.2d at 1209 (“We believe that determinations made by the
panel of arbitrators in the case on appeal are functionally comparable to those of a judge or an
agency hearing examiner . . . .”).
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capricious” award standard, the public policy standard and the essence of the
contract test. Yet, these judicially created grounds rarely result in parties being
successful in persuading a court to vacate an arbitration award.80
The manifest disregard of the law standard comes from dicta in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan.81 This standard has several
definitions,82 but the easiest to comprehend seems to be that the arbitrator had
knowledge of the applicable law, but decided to ignore it.83 The standard
considers the mental state of the arbitrator, not the magnitude or consequence
of the arbitrator error.84 This ground for vacatur “clearly means more than
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.”85 The manifest disregard
standard has been both praised86 and heavily criticized as a source of
confusion87 and as being impossible to prove.88
The “completely irrational” or “arbitrary and capricious” standard calls for
vacating arbitration awards that are “unsupported in the record.”89 This
standard is applicable to findings of fact and does not allow a reviewing court
to replace the arbitrator’s judgment with its own.90 The “completely irrational”
standard centers on the “magnitude and quality of the error,” but can only be
invoked if an arbitrator explains her award.91
Like the manifest disregard standard, the public policy standard for
vacating arbitration awards has no black letter definition. Generally, courts
will vacate awards that are detrimental to public interests such as health or
safety, awards that enforce rights in an illegal contract or that require

80. Rachel C. Corn, Recent Development, LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1085, 1086 (1998).
81. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (“In unrestricted submission, . . . the interpretations of the
law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation.”).
82. See Marcus Mungioli, Comment, The Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: A
Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1079, 1097-1102
(2000).
83. Gerald F. Rath & Richelle S. Kennedy, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 1062
PLI/Corp. 513, 523-24 (1998).
84. Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 100 (1997). The manifest disregard ground for vacatur
is different than bias in that the arbitrator need not favor or show malice towards one party, she
only needs to disregard the law in an unacceptable manner.
85. 1 GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 33.08, at 24 (rev. ed.
2001).
86. See generally Mungioli, supra note 82.
87. See Adam Milam, Comment, A House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards for
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705 (1999).
88. Davis, supra note 84, at 94.
89. Id. at 102.
90. Id. at 103.
91. Id. at 107.
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performing an illegal act, and awards that grant relief reserved to the courts
such as punitive damages.92 Vacating an award under the public policy
standard demands more than an error or misconstruction of the law by the
arbitrator.93 A good example of an arbitration award that violates public policy
would be one that reinstates an employee who was discharged for sexually
harassing a customer’s employee without the arbitrator investigating the
alleged sexual harassment.94
The essence of the contract test focuses on whether the arbitrator, in her
interpretation of the contract, ignored the parties’ intent as set forth in the
arbitration agreement.95 It is argued that placing the intent of the parties above
“finality and efficiency harmonizes with the legislative intent behind the
FAA.”96 However, it is difficult to see how much this standard truly departs
from the statutory ground set forth in section 10(a)(4) of the Act.97 The
essence of the contract standard, along with the completely irrational standard,
have been criticized both for rarely being effective in vacating an award and in
the way the courts define the standards in a vague and complex manner.98
Nonetheless, the party asserting the judicially created ground for vacating
an award has “a staggeringly heavy burden” in showing justification for
vacatur and courts have interpreted these grounds narrowly and have applied
them sparingly.99 It should always be remembered that “[t]he conventional
wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration awards [under any standard,
whether created by courts or the legislature,] are rare.”100
III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE ACT
The United States Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on whether parties
may contractually expand judicial review beyond the grounds set forth in
section 10 of the FAA. Even before the Circuit split over this issue occurred,
92. Id. at 109.
93. See Hayford, supra note 58, at 782.
94. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436,
1438 (3d Cir. 1992). In Stroehmann, the arbitrator refused to investigate the alleged harassment
and, instead, found that the employer had not investigated the incident sufficiently to warrant a
firing for just cause. Id. at 1440. The district court vacated the reinstatement award and
remanded the case to a different arbitrator. The Court of Appeals agreed holding “an arbitrator’s
award reinstating an employee accused of sexual harassment without a determination regarding
the merits of the allegation violates well-established and dominant public policies concerning
sexual harassment in the workplace.” Id. at 1438.
95. See Hayford, supra note 58, at 795.
96. Davis, supra note 84, at 126.
97. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of § 10(a)(4).
98. See Hayford, supra note 58, at 823.
99. See Rath & Kennedy, supra note 83, at 523.
100. JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
624 (2d ed. 1996).
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two commentators thought that, barring a Congressional amendment of the
Act, the Supreme Court might need to resolve the issue.101 This Comment will
look to several Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FAA for guidance on
how the Court might resolve the Circuit split over expanded judicial review of
arbitration awards.
A.

Cases Interpreting Section 4 of the FAA

In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court
dealt with the issue of whether a court or an arbitrator should resolve a claim of
“fraud in the inducement” of an agreement covered by the FAA when the
arbitration agreement was silent on the issue.102The Court held that, under
section 4 of the FAA, a federal court could adjudicate the issue of whether
there was fraud involved the “making” of the arbitration clause, but that it
could not, under the FAA, “consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the
contract generally.”103 In finding that a court could only consider a contract if
the arbitration clause was induced by fraud, the Court honored “the
unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when
selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and
obstruction in the courts.”104
This decision in Prima Paint is important with respect to expanded judicial
review because the Supreme Court acknowledged that once parties agree to
arbitrate they should be free from the “delay and obstruction” of the courts.105
Courts in favor of enforcing agreements that expand the review of arbitration
awards may be ignoring the “unmistakably clear congressional purpose” that
arbitration should be a quick and efficient form of dispute resolution because
these courts are reviewing arbitration awards beyond what is set forth in the
FAA. Therefore, these courts would be reviewing awards not intended by
Congress to be reviewed and prolonging the final resolution of the parties’
dispute. Finally, the Prima Paint Court stated:
the question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to
conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly
has power to legislate. The answer to that can only be in the affirmative. And
it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and

101. See Laird E. Lawrence & Christopher R. Ward, The Availability and Scope of Appeal of
Arbitration Awards Under the Federal, Uniform, and State Acts, THE BRIEF, Spring 2000, at 36.
102. 388 U.S. 395, 396-97 (1967). In Prima Paint, the dispute arose out of a consulting
agreement (and later purchase agreement) signed by the two parties. Id. at 397. Prima Paint
claimed that Flood & Conklin had induced its assent to the consulting agreement by representing
that it was solvent, while, in truth, Flood & Conklin was planning on filing for bankruptcy. Id. at
398.
103. Id. at 403-04.
104. Id. at 404.
105. Prime Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
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confined to the incontestable federal foundations of “control over interstate
commerce and over admiralty.”106

By applying this corollary to the issue in this Comment, the unavoidable
conclusion is that individuals do not have this plenary power to direct courts
how to act in cases under the FAA, since the Act is a regulation of commerce
and individuals, obviously, are not granted the same power to regulate
commerce in the Constitution as Congress is.107 The power to control the
jurisdiction of federal courts is Congress’ alone, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Sheldon v. Sill, by stating that:
Congress, having the power to establish the courts, must define their respective
jurisdictions. . . . Congress may withhold from any court of its creation
jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies [in Article III of the
Constitution]. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as
the statute confers.108

In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., the
Court answered the question of whether a district court properly stayed an
action to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA pending resolution of
state court action involving the issue of arbitrability.109 The Supreme Court
held the district court’s staying of the action “was plainly erroneous” because
of the clear Congressional intent in the FAA to move a dispute out of litigation

106. Id. at 405 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924); S. REP. NO. 536,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924)). See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1995) (“The FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements in contracts
that involve interstate commerce . . . and in maritime transactions, including bills of lading . . .
where there is no independent basis in law or equity for revocation. . . .”). The Supreme Court
has similarly explained that in the area of admiralty and maritime law Congress has broad
powers, much like Congress’ Commerce powers:
After the Constitution went into effect, the substantive law theretofore in force was
not regarded as superceded or as being only the law of the several states, but as having
become the law of the United States—subject to power in Congress to alter, qualify or
supplement it as experience or changing conditions might require. When all is
considered, therefore, there is no room to doubt that the power of Congress extends to the
entire subject and permits of the exercise of a wide discretion.
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1924).
107. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
108. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850).
109. 460 U.S. 1, 7 (1983). In Moses H. Cone, the dispute arose over a construction
company’s demand for payment of its costs due to delay and inaction by the hospital. Id. at 6.
After negotiations failed, the hospital filed an action for declaratory judgment asking for a
declaration that it was not liable and that the construction company’s claims were not arbitrable.
Id. at 7. The construction company then demanded arbitration and, subsequently, filed an action
to compel arbitration per § 4 of the FAA in federal district court. Id. The district stayed the
action to compel pending resolution of the hospital’s state court lawsuit because both lawsuits
involved the issue of whether the claims were arbitrable. Id. at 8.
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and “into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.”110 Applying this
holding to expansion of review of arbitration awards is difficult, but not
impossible. Since the Supreme Court found that Congress intended to move an
arbitrable matter out of court as soon as possible, a priori, there must have
been Congressional intent to not allow arbitrable matters back into court for a
review of the merits of an arbitration award.
In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, a unanimous Supreme Court held
“that a court must compel arbitration of otherwise arbitrable claims,” rejecting
the notion that the main goal of the FAA was to urge quick resolution of
disputes.111 The Court went on to state that the main concern of Congress in
enacting the FAA “was to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered, and that concern requires that [the Court] rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation, at least
absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute.”112 At
first blush, this holding seems to endorse the view that the Court would enforce
a clause in an arbitration agreement requiring expanded judicial review.
However, such a rendering of the Court’s language proves illusory.
The Court will enforce an agreement to arbitrate in accord with
Congressional intent, but a “counterveiling policy” can be found in the limited
grounds for judicial review set forth in section 10 of the FAA.113 If faced with
the issue of whether to permit a party-created standard of review, the Court
would not need to look for a countervailing policy in another statute because
the plain language of section 10 of the FAA explicitly provides instructions to
the courts on when an award should be vacated. These limited grounds
“impose[d] upon the judicial review of arbitration modifies the general
jurisdictional powers of federal courts.”114 Limited judicial review of awards
maintains the integrity of arbitration and guarantees quick settlement of
disputes—the preeminent goal of an arbitration agreement.115
B.

Cases Dealing with the Reach and Scope of the FAA

In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court found that a California
statute requiring court consideration of claims brought under it ran afoul of

110. Id. 460 U.S. at 22.
111. 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). In Byrd, a brokerage firm client sued in federal court for
several violations of federal securities law and various state law claims. Id. at 214. The firm then
sought to sever the state law claims and compel arbitration, which was denied by the district court
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 215-6.
112. Id. at 221 (citation omitted).
113. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
114. Di Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 231, 239 (1999).
115. Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 339 (2000).
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section 2 of the FAA and violated the Supremacy Clause.116 In finding that the
California statute nullified a valid agreement to arbitrate and was adverse to
the FAA, the Court stated: “Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by
allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. Such a
course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by
contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate.”117 The Court further stated
that the FAA “rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules
under the Commerce Clause”118 and that the Act is applied in not only federal,
but state courts as well.119
Southland, at first glance, supports the proposition that parties may expand
judicial review contractually with its militant defense of the enforceability of
arbitration agreements in the face of state judicial action. Yet Southland can
be construed to show the Court’s reluctance in allowing a dispute into court
where it would be bogged down in costs and delay, when the dispute can be
decided fully in arbitration pursuant to the parties’ wishes. Additionally, if the
Supreme Court were willing to hold that the FAA preempts an inconsistent
state law, then it would be difficult to imagine that the Court would allow an
inconsistent arbitration clause to trump the express directive found in section
10 of the Act.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme
Court confronted the issue of whether statutory claims under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act could be arbitrated.120 The Court held that parties could
arbitrate these statutory claims stating that in an agreement
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration.121

The Court went on to find that “adaptability and access to expertise are
hallmarks of arbitration” and that parties choose the “streamlined proceedings”
of arbitration to avoid the extra “effort and expense” of litigation.122 This
language illustrates the Supreme Court’s understanding that parties must give

116. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). The Court held that “[i]n enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.” Id.
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 14-15.
120. 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985). The anti-trust claim arose out of Mitsubishi’s refusal to allow
its dealer, Soler, to divert shipment of some vehicles to other locations. Id. at 618. Soler claimed
Mitsubishi “had conspired to divide markets in restraint of trade.” Id. at 620.
121. Id. at 628.
122. Id. at 633.
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up the advantages of the judicial process, such as full review of an award, to
reap the benefits of arbitration. Creating a litigation-arbitration hybrid by
contracting for expanded judicial review harms the integrity of both processes.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly to the issue of expanded review, Justice
Blackmun wrote that the effectiveness of arbitration “requires that substantive
review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal . . . .”123 The plain
meaning of Justice Blackmun’s quote is that the Court will be reluctant to
review arbitration awards for errors of law or fact, as the review of such
awards should remain limited in order to protect the integrity of the arbitration
process.
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 124 the Supreme Court faced the
issue of how far the FAA reached. A state court had refused to stay a
consumer’s lawsuit and compel arbitration under the FAA, finding no
connection between interstate commerce and an exterminator contract.125 The
Supreme Court found such a nexus by applying a “commerce in fact” test and
again held that the primary purpose of the FAA was enforcement of parties’
agreements to arbitrate.126 More important is the Court’s statement that
arbitration is favorable to parties like individual consumers who have relatively
small claims and “need a less expensive alternative to litigation.”127
Expanding judicial review beyond the narrow grounds set forth in the FAA
would increase costs by allowing more appeals and, therefore, an unassuming
consumer would have no inexpensive forum for dispute resolution if an
expanding clause were placed in an consumer arbitration agreement.
In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Supreme Court decided
who had the power to decide the arbitrability of a dispute under the FAA: an
arbitration panel or the courts.128 The Court, in a unanimous decision, held
that because one party had not agreed to allow the question of arbitrability to
be decided by an arbitrator, the dispute over arbitrability should be decided by
the courts. The Court found that when a party agrees to arbitrate, the right to
have a court decide the matter is greatly diminished, although “[t]he party still
can ask a court to review the arbitrator’s decision, but the court will only set

123. Id. at 638.
124. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
125. Id. at 269.
126. Id. at 277-79.
127. Id. at 280.
128. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). In First Options, the Kaplans had not signed the document
requiring arbitration, but their wholly-owned investment company, MK Investments had. Id. at
941. The arbitrators decided that they had the authority to resolve the dispute on the merits and
did so against the Kaplans. Id. The district court refused to vacate the award and confirmed it,
but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that the dispute with the Kaplans was not arbitrable.
Id.
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that decision aside in very unusual circumstances.”129 The Court said that
when reviewing an arbitrator’s decision regarding arbitrability, “the court
should give a considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his decision
only in certain narrow circumstances.”130 With this language, the Court firmly
stated that it will vacate an arbitration award only in narrow, very unusual
situations. Therefore, the threshold question for expanded judicial review is
whether it is a “narrow” or “unusual” circumstance? By the word “narrow,”
the Court implied that the grounds for modification and vacatur were found in
the Act and that reviewing awards for errors of law or fact was not a ground
for vacatur. By the word “unusual,” the Court stated grounds where the
arbitrator’s misconduct tainted the arbitration process but, as the old adage
goes “to err is human,” so it cannot be unusual for an arbitrator to misinterpret
a law or make some kind of procedural mistake.131 Hence, by analyzing
expanded judicial review through the Court’s language, it seems doubtful that
such expanded review dictated by the parties is permissible.
C. Choice-of-Law Clause Cases
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees132 is of paramount
importance to the issue at hand as its language is cited as authority in the
Gateway Technologies and LaPine cases to support expanded review of
arbitration awards through freedom of contract.133 In Volt, the Supreme Court
held that a California statute permitting a court to stay arbitration until related
litigation was resolved was not preempted by the FAA because the parties had
stipulated in their arbitration agreement that the arbitration would be governed
by California law.134 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion contained
strong language favoring enforcement of the parties’ agreement by its terms:

129. Id. at 942. The Court stated that these narrow circumstances are found in § 10 of the
FAA and the manifest disregard standard. Id.
130. Id. at 943.
131. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), where the Supreme Court stated:
As [the arbitrators’] award may be made without explanation of their reasons and
without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators’ conception of the legal
meaning of such statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or
‘material fact’ . . . cannot be examined. Power to vacate an award is limited.
Id. See also Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)
(“In order to advance the goals of arbitration, courts may vacate awards only for an overt
disregard of the law and not merely for an erroneous interpretation.”).
132. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
133. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995);
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997).
134. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470. The dispute arose out of Volt’s claim for extra compensation it
incurred in installing an electrical system on the campus of Stanford University. Id. The
construction contract had an arbitration clause and a choice-of-law clause providing that
California law would govern any disputes. Id. Volt demanded arbitration to resolve its claim and
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[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed,
such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA’s primary purpose of
ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their
terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and
parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see
fit.135

However, this holding giving “effect to the contractual rights and expectation
of the parties”136 can be limited to parties agreeing to which laws will rule their
arbitration. A choice-of-law clause is an aspect of an arbitration agreement
that will be enforced per its terms because there is no uniform set of arbitration
procedures or rules and its enforcement does not violate any other FAA
policy.137
It is important to note that the dispute in Volt was over when or if
arbitration was to occur, not whether the arbitrator made a correct award.
Clauses that expand judicial review involve substantive, not procedural,
aspects of the arbitration.138 A fair reading of the FAA would lead to the
conclusion that, once an arbitrator makes an award, the FAA takes control by
applying the sections permitting confirmation, modification or vacatur if the
parties had agreed to allow this.139 Allowing parties to expand judicial review
of awards beyond the grounds in section 10 of the FAA would definitely
offend a policy in the FAA—section 10 itself. Furthermore, the Supreme

Stanford responded by filing a lawsuit in state court for fraud and breach against Volt and seeking
indemnity from two others companies with whom Stanford had no arbitration agreement. Id. at
470-71. Volt motioned to compel in the state court and Stanford motioned for a stay pursuant to
a California statute that permitted a stay of an arbitration pending resolution of a lawsuit if parties
to the lawsuit were not bound by the arbitration agreement. Id. at 471.
135. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. The Court further stated unequivocally that:
[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural
rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of
private agreements to arbitrate. Interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable
state rules governing the conduct of arbitration . . . simply does not offend the rule of
liberal construction set forth in Moses H. Cone, nor does it offend any other policy
embodied in the FAA.
Id. at 476.
136. Id. at 479.
137. Id. at 476.
138. One commentator felt that
while parties are free to contract as to the procedure, scope, and forum of an
arbitration, parties are not necessarily free to contract as to the extent of judicial review of
an arbitral award. An expansion of judicial review would go beyond merely contracting
as to the scope or procedure of the arbitration and would be contracting as to the
substantive enforcement of the award.
Curtin, supra note 115, at 363.
139. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1994).
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Court in Volt said parties are “generally free” in molding their own
agreements. To read this language as stating that the Supreme Court has given
parties free reign over how their arbitration will be conducted before, during
and after, would be to ignore a limiting adjective. What the word “generally”
implies is that there may be circumstances where the Court would refuse to
enforce the parties’ agreement to arbitrate by its terms, yet the question
remains if expanded judicial review would be one of these circumstances.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.140 is another case
concerning interpretation of a choice-of-law clause in an arbitration
agreement.An arbitrator had included punitive damages in his award, but the
district court vacated the award finding that the arbitrator had exceeded his
powers.141 However, the Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision (Justice
Thomas dissenting), overruled the vacatur finding that the choice-of-law or
arbitration clauses did not intend to preclude the awarding of punitive
damages.142 Finding the contract ambiguous, the Court applied the common
law rule of construing the ambiguous language against the drafter and
reinforced the principle that a contract should be read to give effect to all terms
and to make all the terms consistent with one another.143
This type of contractual construction may be necessary in the context of a
clause calling for expanded judicial review. For instance, consider an
arbitration clause stating that “the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and
binding on all parties except that any party may petition a court of competent
jurisdiction for review of errors of law.”144 This clause appears to be
ambiguous and misleading on its face by stating that the arbitration award will
be final and binding, but that it can be appealed for any error of law. This
broad discretion in allowing a dispute into court directly conflicts with the final
and binding language. Which phrase should be given more importance? It
seems that the final and binding language rules the clause as “the judiciary is
reluctant to interfere with arbitration awards because the very goal of binding
arbitration is to avoid lengthy litigation.”145 Moreover, final and binding
decisions are “crucial if arbitration is to result in the same legal rights as
judicial litigation.”146

140. 514 U.S. 52 (1995). The clause at issue stated that New York law would govern any
arbitration and the law of that state allows only judges, not arbitrators, to award punitive
damages. Id. at 53.
141. Id. at 54-55.
142. Id. at 62.
143. Id. at 62-63.
144. New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 57 (D. Mass. 1998).
145. Brian T. McCartney, Contracting for Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Can an
“Errors of Law” Clause Provide Two Bites of the Apple?, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 151, 160 (1997).
146. 4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 39.1.1 (1999).
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D. Cases Regarding Economic Factors of Arbitration
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph147 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,148 are probative on the
issue of expanded review in that the Court raised the concerns it had about the
cost effectiveness of arbitration. In Green Tree Financial Corp., a party
attempted to have an arbitration agreement silent on the issue of costs
invalidated due to the prohibitive expense of the arbitration.149 The Court
rejected the party’s argument because the party failed to show why the
arbitration was expensive and held that such an invalidation of an agreement
based on costs goes against the federal policy of encouraging arbitration.150
This precedent is important in illustrating that the Court will look to economic
factors in interpreting an arbitration agreement. Therefore, it might not be
outside the realm of reality for the Supreme Court to weigh the economic
detriment that parties would suffer in submitting awards to heightened judicial
review with the advantages of contractual freedom.
The Circuit City case addressed whether employment contracts are beyond
the grasp of the FAA.151 After finding that the FAA applied to all employment
contracts except those for transportation workers, the Supreme Court stated:
Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit
that may be of importance in employment litigation, which often involves
smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts. These
litigation costs to parties (and the accompanying burden to the Courts) would
be compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are often
presented in disputes arising from the employment relationship.152

With this pronouncement, it could be difficult for the Court not to take into
consideration the economic burden on parties and the docket burden on the
courts if parties were allowed to expand judicial review beyond what is set
forth in the FAA.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
AWARDS
This Comment takes the position that courts should not allow parties to
contractually expand judicial review of arbitration awards beyond the narrow
grounds in the FAA.153 Before further expounding on the reasoning for this

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

531 U.S. 79 (2000).
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92.
Id. at 91-92.
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
Id. at 123.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
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stance154 and before examining the cases that support the limited review as
established in the FAA, however, those cases that support contractually
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards must be examined.
A.

Cases Allowing Expanded Judicial Review
1.

In re Fils et Cables D’Acier De Lens

In re Fils et Cables D’Acier De Lens155 was the first case to allow parties
to contract for expanded judicial review. The arbitration provision at issue, as
quoted by the Court, provided in part, that
the court shall have the power to review (1) whether the findings of fact
rendered by the arbitrator are, on the entire record of said arbitration
proceedings, supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether as a matter of
law based on said findings of fact the award should be affirmed, modified or
vacated.156

An arbitration panel issued findings of fact and an award in favor of Fils et
Cables, which sought confirmation in court while Midland Metals sought
vacatur or modification of the damages portion of the award.157 The court
recognized the key issue to be whether parties can contractually alter a federal
court’s part in the arbitration process.158 The court then went through a short
laundry list of reasons why contractual expansion of judicial review should not
be allowed.159 However, the opinion moved on to say that arbitration is a
“creature of contract”160 leading to a conclusion that a party will not be forced
to enter into arbitration “under rules to which he has not assented.”161
The court then shifted its analysis to determine if there is “a jurisdictional
or public policy barrier” to parties being able to expand judicial review.162 The
court found no jurisdictional barrier existed as the parties were in court based
on diversity jurisdiction163 and then summarily dismissed any possible public
policy impediment by holding that the process the parties agreed upon would
be far less taxing on the court than a full trial and then reviewed the arbitration

154. See infra Part V.
155. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
156. Id. at 242 (quoting paragraph 13(c) of the parties’ contracts).
157. Id. at 243.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 243-44. The court pointed to the limited grounds for vacatur and modification in
the FAA, arbitration as a less expensive and less complicated alternative to adjudication,
arbitration awards cannot be vacated for misinterpretation of the law, and that requiring
arbitrators to explain awards diminishes the efficiency of arbitration. Id.
160. In re Fils et Cables D’Acier De Lens, 584 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
161. Id. at 244.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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award under the parties’ contractually dictated standard.164 Through its
review, the court confirmed part of the award, modified another part and
remanded yet another issue to the arbitration panel for further consideration.165
This decision should have little or no precedential value for several
reasons. First, the court cites no authority to support its conclusion that parties
should be free to alter the roles of courts in arbitration. By the court’s
permissive reasoning, as long as no public policy or jurisdictional barriers
existed, parties could provide for judicial review of an award “by flipping a
coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”166 Second, the court failed to
consider that sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, itself, are formidable public
policy barriers to allowing contractual expansion. Third, although Fils et
Cables has not been expressly overruled, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has strongly stated its preferences for adhering to the limited grounds for
vacatur and modification in the FAA when reviewing awards.167
A relatively recent decision from the Second Circuit, Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. N.Y. City Transit Authority,168 is cited by Domke on
Commercial Arbitration for the proposition that “parties may contractually
provide for a court’s scope of review of an arbitration award.”169 The clause of
the arbitration agreement at issue in Westinghouse read, as follows: “the
review of the Court shall be limited to the question [sic] of whether or not the
[arbitrator’s] determination is arbitrary, capricious or so grossly erroneous to

164. Id. at 244-45.
165. In re Fils et Cables, 584 F. Supp. at 247.
166. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
167. See Office of Supply v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (“An
award will not be set aside because of an error on the part of the arbitrators in their interpretation
of the law.”); In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (“It is a truism that an arbitration
award will not be vacated for a mistaken interpretation of law.”); John T. Brady & Co. v. FormEze Sys., Inc., 623 F.2d 261, 264 (2d. Cir. 1980) (“This court has generally refused to second
guess an arbitrator’s resolution of a contract dispute . . . [and] accorded the narrowest of readings
to the [FAA’s] authorization to vacate awards. . . .”); Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626
F.2d 1108, 1110(2d. Cir. 1980) (“[I]t is a well-settled proposition that judicial review of an
arbitration award should be, and is, very narrowly limited.”); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City
Dist. Council Carpenters Benefits Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Section 10 of the Act
delineates the grounds upon which a court may vacate an arbitrator’s award.”); Barbier v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The award may be vacated
only if at least one of the grounds specified in 9 U.S.C. §10 is found to exist.”); Folkways Music
Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Arbitration awards are subject to
very limited review in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling
disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.”); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim &
Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Folkways Music
Publishers, Inc., 989 F.2d at 111, for the limited grounds for vacatur).
168. 14 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1994).
169. 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 85, § 34.15, at 27.
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evidence bad faith.”170 The court held this arbitrary and capricious standard
was permissible, finding it went against no public policy.171 However, this
decision does not mean that the Second Circuit will enforce a clause expanding
judicial review by an error of law standard. First, the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard has already been recognized as a judicially created ground
for vacatur, so the parties were merely incorporating this standard into their
agreement.172 Second, the court rejected Westinghouse’s argument that the
court should apply an “error of law” standard pursuant to New York law.173
2.

Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.

In Gateway Technologies, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the
first federal circuit to endorse the parties’ right to contractually expand judicial
review of an arbitration award and applied the parties’ standard of de novo
review for errors of law.174 MCI had won a bid for a contract with the Virginia
Department of Corrections to implement a phone system that would allow
prisoners to make collect calls without the need of operator assistance.175 MCI
then subcontracted with Gateway, who agreed to furnish all the necessary
technology for the system.176 The contract called for binding arbitration
“‘except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal.’”177 A dispute arose over
the design of the system, resulting in MCI implementing its own system and
terminating the contract with Gateway, and arbitration ensued.178 The
arbitrator found MCI had breached the contract and awarded Gateway actual
and punitive damages, leading MCI to file a motion to vacate the award in
district court, while Gateway simultaneously filed a motion to confirm.179 The
district court confirmed the award, but applied a “harmless error standard” of
review rather than the more scrutinizing “errors of law” standard, leading to
MCI’s appeal.180
The Fifth Circuit began its opinion by admitting that judicial review of
arbitration awards is usually very narrow and can only be vacated on the
grounds set out in section 10 of the FAA.181 However, citing both

170. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 14 F.3d at 821-22 (quoting Article 8.03(c) of the parties’
contract).
171. Id. at 824.
172. For a discussion of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, see supra Part II.C.
173. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 14 F.3d at 822.
174. 64 F.3d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1995).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Article 9 of the parties’ contract dated Apr. 29, 1991).
178. Id. at 995-96.
179. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995).
180. Id.
181. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

534

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:509

Mastrobuono and Volt, the court stated that parties may expand judicial review
through their contract.182 The Fifth Circuit went on to say that “[b]ecause
these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual
provision supplements the FAA’s default standard of review and allows for de
novo review of issues of law embodied in the arbitration award.”183 The Fifth
Circuit found that, by not reviewing the award pursuant to the parties’
agreement, the district court had erred and, therefore, frustrated the intent of
the parties.184 Relying once again on Volt, the court held that when parties
contract “to subject an arbitration award to expanded judicial review, federal
arbitration policy demands that the court conduct its review according to the
terms of the arbitration contract.”185 From this bold proclamation, the court
applied the “errors of law” standard of review to the actual and punitive
damages awards and confirmed the actual damages award, while the punitive
damages of $2,000,000 was vacated because the arbitrator failed to apply
Virginia law properly.186
Gateway Technologies raises several noteworthy issues. First, the court
does not address the apparent ambiguity in the contract’s arbitration clause.
The clause stated that the parties agreed to binding arbitration; however, except
that the award was subject to appeal for “errors of law.” This clause appears to
be self-contradictory. According to the Dictionary of Dispute Resolution,
“binding” is defined as “[o]bligatory; creat[ing] a legal or social indebtedness
of obligation . . . .”187 By calling for the review of a “binding” award, the
parties sought the proverbial second bite at the apple of arbitration. In essence,
the parties appeared to be contracting for non-binding arbitration, which would
mean that the award did not create an obligation. Therefore, the parties should
have filed a regular lawsuit, rather than motions to confirm and vacate the
award.
Second, expanding the scope of review to include “errors of law” ignores
the FAA’s intent to provide for a quick and efficient dispute resolution
process.188 Clauses such as “errors of law” included in arbitration agreements
would permit a party unsatisfied with an arbitration award (like MCI) to claim
an “error of law,” which would place the dispute into court and result in parties
spending more time and money to resolve the dispute than if they had simply
filed a lawsuit in the first place.189 If parties are primarily concerned with

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. at 997. See id. at 997 n.3 for a reference to Volt.
Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997.
Id.
Id. at 997-99.
DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 59.
See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
See McCartney, supra note 145, at 162.
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“avoiding irrational or excessive results” rather than “finality and efficiency,”
they “may be better off in conventional litigation.”190
The third concern was recognized by the Gateway Technologies court: the
great disparity in financial resources between the parties, albeit in the context
of Gateway’s fiduciary claim against MCI.191 Perhaps the court should have
focused on this aspect of the case in a different way. The telecommunications
giant subcontracted with a smaller organization, Gateway, to implement the
phone system and only when MCI determined that it could make more money
by not using Gateway’s system did MCI terminate the contract.192 It is not
difficult to imagine that the party with more financial resources and bargaining
power will want, first, an arbitration clause to protect itself from litigation
costs and jury awards and, second, an expanded judicial review of an award if
it suffers huge losses at the arbitration level like MCI did. Adherence to the
limited grounds for vacatur or modification of the FAA193 may be the only
safeguard against a party using this strategy to cover itself from all angles.
Finally, did the Gateway Technologies court properly apply Volt? It seems
it may not have. Volt dealt solely with whether the FAA preempted California
law, which was the choice-of-law in the arbitration agreement.194 In Volt the
Supreme Court found that there was no preemptive provision in the FAA195
and that parties were free to contract for any arrangement they desired
provided that the terms did not do “violence to the policies behind the
FAA.”196 While there is no provision regarding preemption in the FAA, there
are two sections establishing grounds for vacatur, modification, and correction.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s labeling of the grounds for vacatur in the FAA
as “a default standard of review” has no basis in the statutory language or the
legislative history of the FAA.197 The Gateway Technologies court quoted
Volt to support its statement that parties may “specify by contract the rules
under which [the] arbitration will be conducted.”198 This reliance on Volt is
misplaced. Without a doubt, the Supreme Court in Volt held that parties could

190. Steven P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 261-62 (1999).
191. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 1001. To illustrate this disparity, MCI’s 1999 revenues totaled
$37,120,000,000. THE NEW YORK TIMES ALMANAC 2001: THE ALMANAC OF RECORD 347
(John W. Wright ed., 2000) (citing Fortune Magazine).
192. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995.
193. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994).
194. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470
(1989).
195. Id. at 477.
196. Id. at 479.
197. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
198. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 52, 57 (1995)).
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contract for the rules that would govern the arbitration;199 however, the Court
stated nowhere that parties were free to contract as to how a federal court
would conduct its proceedings. The Fifth Circuit found that the contractual
expansion of judicial review supplements the standards set forth in the FAA,200
yet what this expansion actually does is supercede the FAA grounds by
replacing what Congress found to be the grounds for vacatur. Due to its
importance, this point shall be discussed further both in this subpart and in Part
V.
3.

Syncor International Corp. v. McLeland

Syncor International Corp. v. McLeland, an unpublished opinion from the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, cited the Gateway Technologies decision as
guidance when that court was confronted with the question of expanded
judicial review.201 The dispute in the case arose out of McLeland’s
employment with Syncor International, a pharmaceuticals distributor and
owner and operator of pharmacies.202 As a result of the employment, which
ended in 1994 only for him to be rehired shortly thereafter on a temporary
basis, McLeland signed three separate agreements each promising that he
would not compete against Syncor, solicit any Syncor customers or encourage
other Syncor employees to leave the company.203 While employed with
Syncor, McLeland started his own pharmacy, sought and received investment
capital from a Syncor employee, solicited the business of Syncor’s two largest
accounts in the area, and successfully recruited an employee from a pharmacy
related to Syncor.204
As a result of McLeland’s conduct, Syncor demanded arbitration pursuant
to an agreement signed by the parties.205 This agreement stated that the
“‘arbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal
reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected by judicial review for
such error.’”206 The arbitrator entered an award for Syncor, which included all
of the stock in McLeland’s new enterprise, and Syncor filed a motion in
district court for confirmation.207 The award was confirmed over McLeland’s

199. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
201. 120 F.3d 262, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (per
curiam).
202. Id. at *1.
203. Id. McLeland had been a Regional Manager for Syncor but, after being terminated for
business reasons, was rehired as a temporary pharmacist. Id.
204. Id. at *2.
205. Id. at *1-2.
206. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6
(4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
207. Id. at *3.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

THE PROBLEMS OF PERMITTING EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW

537

objections and he appealed, claiming the arbitration was invalid because it was
conducted ex parte, the dispute was non-arbitrable, and the district court
applied the wrong standard of judicial review in confirming the award.208
After ruling against McLeland on the first two issues, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with him that the district court erred in not reviewing the arbitration
award under the arbitration agreement’s heightened de novo standard.209
However, in applying that heightened standard, the court found “that the
arbitrator did not commit error, either legal or factual,” and since the district
court’s error was harmless, the Fourth Circuit refused to remand the case.210
The per curiam opinion of the Fourth Circuit relied exclusively on
Gateway Technologies in holding that the expanded judicial review set out in
the parties’ contract was permitted.211 As this Comment has argued, the
Gateway decision has its flaws, which do not bear repetition; however, there
are additional reasons why the Syncor decision should not be given much
weight. First, and most obviously, it is an unpublished opinion, so it is of little,
if any, precedential value,212 and, likewise, it should not be assumed that the
Fourth Circuit has definitively ruled in favor of allowing expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards. Similarly, the opinion was per curiam, which
suggests that no judge wanted to take credit for such a tenuous holding.
The second major analytical issue in Syncor is the construction of the
review-expanding clause. The first part of the clause stated, “‘[t]he arbitrator
shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning . . . .’”213
By denying the arbitrator this power, this clause attempted to shoehorn its
expanded standard for judicial review into section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which
allows vacatur “[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers . . . .”214 It
should raise eyebrows that the parties sought to deny an arbitrator a power no
parties would ever agree that he has—the power to commit legal errors. It
should also be noted that this would establish an extraordinarily high standard
for arbitrators, which few would be able to meet. No human judgment is
perfect and this type of perfection-seeking clause could result in frivolous
208. Id.
209. Id. at *6.
210. Id. at *7.
211. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6
(4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
212. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a) (“[T]his Court will not cite an unpublished disposition in any of its
published opinions or unpublished dispositions. Citation of this Court’s unpublished dispositions
in briefs and oral arguments . . . within this Circuit is disfavored, except for the purpose of
establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case.”). But see Anastasoff v. United States,
223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We hold that the portion of [8th Circuit Local] Rule 28A(i)
that declares that unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III,
because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the ‘judicial.’”).
213. Syncor, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (quoting arbitration agreement).
214. 9 U.S.C § 10(a)(4) (1994).
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attempts to vacate an award for any mistake, even a harmless one, which the
arbitrator could make during the course of arbitration.215
The second part of the clause stated “‘the award may be vacated or
corrected by judicial review for any such error.’”216 Here, the parties made the
mistake of placing the standard back outside of section 10 of the FAA by
allowing for review of the “error” (a standard not mentioned in section 10),
instead of review of an arbitrator overstepping his powers. Furthermore, the
second part of the clause also violated section 11 of the FAA by allowing
correction for errors of law, a ground not mentioned in that section.217
Therefore, the court could have found that the standard of review was the
“exceeding powers” of section 10(a)(4), but that the negative power put forth
in the agreement was a cornerstone assumption in all arbitration contracts, and
need not be mentioned, leading to a regular limited review under the FAA.
4.

LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.

The last, and possibly most persuasive, decision permitting the expanded
judicial review of arbitration awards is LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp.218 The facts of this case revolved around complicated commercial
transactions involving the manufacturing and marketing of computer disk
drives.219 The arbitration clause at issue directed that “[t]he Court shall vacate,
modify, or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in
the [FAA], (ii) where the arbitrators’ findings of fact are not supported by the
substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are
erroneous.”220 LaPine filed an action in district court alleging a breach of a
trade agreement, and although Kyocera was successful in compelling
arbitration, the resulting awards were in favor of LaPine.221 LaPine
subsequently petitioned the district court for confirmation of the awards, while
Kyocera sought vacatur or modification of the awards.222
The district court confirmed the award and refused to review the award
“for errors of law or fact.”223 In doing so, the district court refused to apply

215. See Jiang-Schueger, supra note 114, at 247 (“Parties, who would not otherwise expand
judicial review, may use such a provision for safety in case they lose arbitration.”).
216. Syncor, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (quoting arbitration agreement).
217. See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994).
218. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
219. Id. at 886. For a more detailed statement of the facts of the case, see LaPine Tech. Corp.
v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 699-701 (N.D. Cal. 1995) [hereinafter LaPine I].
220. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887.
221. Id. at 886-87.
222. LaPine I, 909 F. Supp. at 699.
223. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887.
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both In re Fils et Cables de Lens and Gateway Technologies.224 The court,
with the help of a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case,225 held that “its
power to adjudicate in the exercise of . . . jurisdiction, particularly where
conferred by statute as here, cannot be changed or altered by the agreement of
the parties.”226 The district court distinguished Gateway Technologies from
Mastrobuono and Volt by showing that the latter two dealt with the powers of
parties to dictate “the subject matter and rules of arbitration,” not with the
powers of parties to expand judicial review of arbitral awards.227 The district
court noted “that while arbitration is non-judicial dispute resolution,
confirmation or vacation is not part of such a proceeding, but is a judicial act
provided for by statute.”228
Kyocera appealed the district court decision, and the Ninth Circuit boiled
the issue down to whether “federal court review of an arbitration agreement
[is] necessarily limited to the grounds set forth in the FAA or can the court
apply greater scrutiny, if the parties have so agreed?”229 The court held that
the parties’ agreement must be honored by reviewing the award according to
the agreed upon standard pursuant to several Supreme Court decisions making
“it clear that the primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of
private agreements to arbitrate, in accordance with agreements’ terms.”230 The
court failed to make the distinction, as the district court had,231 that Volt dealt
with rules of arbitration and not the parties’ powers to direct court review. Volt
and the other cases the court relied upon232 were interested with “the scope and
procedural regulations of the arbitral process, not the substantive enforcement
of awards or of the arbitration agreement itself.”233 In response to this
procedural argument, the Ninth Circuit
224. LaPine I, 909 F. Supp. at 705 (“This court is satisfied that the parties may not by
agreement alter by expansion the provisions for judicial review contained in the [FAA].”).
225. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th
Cir. 1991). This case and other Seventh Circuit cases will be discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
226. LaPine I, 909 F. Supp. at 703.
227. Id. at 705.
228. Id.
229. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1997). The court
seems to make a textual error in saying review of agreements is at issue, when, in fact, the review
of arbitration awards is at issue. Nonetheless, this Comment will assume the court meant to state
that the review arbitrator’s award and not the agreement was the main issue of the case.
230. Id. at 888. Shortly after this statement the court cites a rather lengthy quote from Volt
Information Sciences to support its position that freedom of contract is the overriding goal of
arbitration. Id.
231. LaPine I, 909 F. Supp. at 705.
232. See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888. The court cites cases such as Mastrobuono, First Options
of Chicago, Mitsubishi Motors and Prima Paint for the general proposition that arbitration is run
by the parties and a court must enforce the parties’ agreement. Id. For a discussion of these
cases, see supra Part III.
233. Curtin, supra note 115, at 362.
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recognize[d] that agreeing to the scope of review by a court is not precisely the
same as agreeing to the scope of the arbitration itself. Nevertheless, the
standards against which the work of the arbitrator will be measured are
inexorably intertwined with the arbitration’s scope, affect its whole structure,
and may even encourage the arbitrator to adhere to a high standard of decision
making.234

Despite its persuasive reasoning, the court failed to address three problems
that will arise when federal courts agree to enforce parties’ agreements to
expand judicial review of awards. First, forcing a judge to adjudicate based on
the parties’ private contracts presents serious implications for the institutional
integrity of the judiciary.235 Secondly, petitions seeking expanded review
outside of the FAA will end up in the crowded court system before busy and
perhaps uninterested judges, which frustrates the party winning at arbitration
seeking award enforcement and encourages stubborn parties bent on delay.236
Finally, only through the limited standards of review in the FAA “can the
integrity of the arbitral process be maintained and the quick resolution of
disputes be assured, which, in the end, is the ultimate goal of any contractual
provision involving the resolution of disputes.”237
The LaPine court argued that if courts refuse to apply the parties’
“searching review” of an award, then the court is ignoring the wishes of the
parties in defiance of what Congress had intended.238 However, what did
Congress intend by enacting the limited standards of review of awards in
section 10 of the FAA? Since the legislative history is silent on the intent, it
would be safe to assume that Congress meant to limit judicial intervention in
the arbitration process by allowing parties to attempt to vacate awards only in
very specific, restrictive circumstances.239 The LaPine court then rejected the

234. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 889.
235. Cole, supra note 29, at 1203. Professor Cole further stated:
requests for non-traditional judicial intervention present the possibility of significant
threats to the courts’ institutional integrity. Imagine, for instance, that the parties have
agreed that a court will have the power to review an arbitral award, but that the review
must be accomplished by flipping a coin, or by casting lots.
Id. While this may seem like a far-fetched hypothetical, the language in LaPine places
no limitation on the parties’ power to direct how courts can review awards.
236. Stanley McDermott, III, Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Is a Mixed
Blessing That Raises Serious Questions, DISP. RESOL. MAG., FALL 1998, at 21.
237. Curtin, supra note 114, at 339.
238. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 890. The court then cited First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan as
support that the Supreme Court has spurned courts from ignoring parties’ intentions. Id.
However, First Options dealt with the issue of whether courts should review an arbitrator’s
decision regarding arbitrability in the same manner that it reviews other arbitration decisions.
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1985).
239. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
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dicta found in Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.240
concerning creation of jurisdiction by contract by saying that the FAA was not
a jurisdictional statute limiting or conferring power on federal courts, but “a
regulation of commerce.”241 The Ninth Circuit concluded its opinion by
holding that the Act encourages agreements that expand judicial review and
that “the FAA is not an apotropaion designed to avert overburdened court
dockets; it is designed to avert interference with the contractual rights of the
parties.”242 Yet there is a good amount of legislative history that refutes the
court’s claim and states one of the purposes of the Act was to reduce the
burden on courts.243
Judge Kozinski’s concurrence in LaPine acknowledges that Congress was
silent on whether courts could apply parties’ standards of judicial review, but
finds, due to the strong policy of freedom of contract, that Congress would
probably not object to enforcement of the parties’ agreement.244 The
concurrence makes an interesting point that what district courts would be doing
in reviewing arbitration awards would be no different than what district courts
already do in hearing appeals regarding decisions from bankruptcy courts or
administrative courts.245 There is one important distinction. Appeals from
those bodies are granted by Congress, while appeals of arbitration agreements
are granted by the parties to the arbitration.
Besides possibly misconstruing Congressional intent, Supreme Court
rulings and the public policies underlying arbitration, the question remains of
whether the Ninth Circuit ignored its own precedent in allowing contractual
expansion of judicial review. In A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough,246
the Ninth Circuit stated that “various policy arguments urging tighter judicial
review of arbitration awards are not persuasive. Such a course would
undermine the strong federal policy encouraging arbitration as a ‘prompt,
economical and adequate’ method of dispute resolution for those who agree to
it.”247 Stronger language cutting against the expansion of judicial review can
be found in San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay
Terminals Ltd.248 In this decision, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[T]he statutory grounds for vacating or modifying the award of arbitrators are
stated in [sections 10 and 11 of the Act] and neither section authorizes the

240. Chicago Typographical Union No.16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505
(7th Cir. 1991).
241. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 890.
242. Id. at 890-91.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
244. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891.
245. Id.
246. 967 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
247. Id. at 1404 n.2.
248. 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
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setting aside of an award “on grounds of erroneous finding of fact or
misinterpretation of law” . . . Had Congress contemplated that any different
rule should now become operative, or that a mere error of law should be a
basis for setting aside an award, it would have no difficulty in drafting a
separate subdivision of sections 10 or 11 which would say that.249

The LaPine decision goes completely in the opposite direction and finds that
parties, not Congress, may expand the grounds for review under the FAA. It is
strange that the LaPine court chose not to directly distinguish or overrule either
of these cases, which seemingly conflict directly with LaPine’s holding.
In conclusion, LaPine raises the question of whether the FAA is a license
for parties to interfere with the federal judicial process. The LaPine district
court opinion may have answered this question best: “The role of the federal
courts cannot be subverted to serve private interests at the whim of contracting
parties.”250
B.

Cases Rejecting the Notion of Party Created Expanded Review
1.

Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals officially created a split among the
circuits in June 2001 with its decision in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.251 In
1993, Bowen, on several occasions, saw an “oily sheen” on a creek located on
his property.252 After an independent study and an Oklahoma Corporate
Commission investigation, it was determined that an Amoco pipeline was
249. Id. at 801-02.
250. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
251. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001). The term “officially” is used as there already existed
strong indications that the Second, Seventh, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of
Appeals would not allow expanded judicial review of arbitration awards. See, e.g., Chicago
Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[Parties]
cannot contract for judicial review of [an] award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by
contract.”); Bavarati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (The
grounds for vacatur “are exhaustively stated in the [Act].”); DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v.
Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n arbitrator’s award is not
appealable. It is, however, subject to limited judicial review.”); Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58
F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have repeatedly held that 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides the
exclusive grounds for setting aside an arbitration award.”); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance
Assocs., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The grounds on which the plaintiffs can attack
the award are limited to those set forth in the [FAA].”); UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp.,
148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not believe it is yet a foregone conclusion that
parties may effectively agree to compel a federal court to cast aside [§§ 9-11] of the FAA.”);
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“The strong federal policy in favor of voluntary commercial arbitration would be undermined if
the courts had the final say on the merits of the award.”). For a listing of the Second Circuit
decisions endorsing limited review, see supra note 167.
252. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 927.
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leaking and caused the contamination.253 Due to Amoco’s continued failure to
admit responsibility, Bowen filed a lawsuit in federal district court seeking
damages for tort, breach of contract and exemplary damages.254 Amoco
responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration, which the district court
granted pursuant to the original easement agreement signed by both of the
parties’ predecessors in interest.255 Just prior to arbitration, Amoco was
ordered to uncover portions of its pipeline showing, with the help of expert
analysis, that over 1,000 feet of pipeline had been replaced in 1950, that the
soil around the pipeline was contaminated and that it was a leak in the pipeline
that resulted in the contamination of Bowen’s creek.256 Bowen and Amoco
agreed that the arbitration would be governed by the Rules for Non
Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes with one modification:
expanded scope of judicial review of the arbitration award.257 More to the
point, they agreed that either party had the power to appeal an award within
thirty days to the district court “‘on the grounds that the award is not supported
by the evidence.’”258 The arbitration panel awarded Bowen over $3,000,000
payable to an escrow fund to clean up the creek, $100,000 for damage to
property value, $1,200,000 for nuisance, $1,000,000 in punitive damages and
$41,000 for investigation costs.259 Bowen filed a motion for confirmation per
section 9 of the FAA, and Amoco, in turn, filed a motion for vacatur of the
award pursuant to the arbitration agreement.260 The district court refused to
apply the expanded scope of judicial review and confirmed the arbitration
award in favor of Bowen.261 Amoco then appealed seeking vacatur and
remand to the arbitrator or vacatur and remand to the district court to review
the award pursuant to the expanded review provided for in the arbitration
agreement.262
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion began by making it clear that the FAA does
not create federal jurisdiction or any new rights, but creates a body of law
governing arbitration agreements.263 The court then stated that its review of
arbitration awards was “strictly limited” and “highly deferential” to the
arbitrator under the FAA.264 The reason, the court stated, for the employment

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 928.
Id.
Id. at 928 n.1.
Id. at 928-29.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
Id. at 931 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1995)).
Id. at 932.
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of this strict review and use of caution in reviewing awards is that the
“‘purpose behind arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of
court proceedings.’ A court may not, therefore, independently judge an
arbitration award.”265 The court unequivocally stated that an award may only
be vacated under the limited statutory or judicially created grounds and that the
reasoning behind the FAA “do not support a rule allowing parties to alter the
judicial process by private contract.”266 The court recognized, through
Supreme Court decisions, that parties have the contractual freedom to structure
arbitration agreements to their own liking and that the court’s decision “must
further the FAA’s primary policy ensuring judicial enforcement of private
agreements to arbitrate.”267
The court identified the LaPine and Gateway Technologies decisions
allowing expanded judicial review, but disagreed with those decisions’
conclusions that Supreme Court precedent obliged the enforcement of
contractually expanded judicial review.268 The Tenth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court “has never said parties are free to interfere with the judicial
process . . . [and] no authority clearly allows private parties to determine how
federal courts review arbitration awards.”269 The court pointed out that Volt
and other cases favoring party crafted arbitration “simply do not dictate that
courts submit to varying standards of review imposed by private contract.”270
The court found that allowing enforcement of expanded judicial review would
be illogical because:
The FAA’s limited review ensures judicial respect for the arbitration process
and prevents courts from enforcing parties’ agreements to arbitrate only to
refuse to respect the results of the arbitration. These limited standards
manifest a legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring arbitration by
preserving the independence of the arbitration process. Unlike § 4 of the
FAA, . . . the provisions governing judicial review of awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1011, contain no language requiring district courts to follow parties’
agreements.271

This explanation is why the Bowen court’s analysis is superior to the opinions
in Gateway Technologies and LaPine—it takes into account the actual
language of the FAA and is able to recognize that the Supreme Court had not
yet even come close to weighing in on the issue. Without specific direction
from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit looked to the next strongest
265. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1986)).
266. Id. at 932-23.
267. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
268. Id.
269. Id. (citing LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kozinski, J., concurring and Mayer, J., dissenting)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 935.
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possible authorities for guidance: the language Congress used in the Act and
the nature of arbitration itself. The court cited with favor Chicago
Typographical Union and UHC Management Co.—two cases from the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits, respectively, that have expressed disapproval of expanded
review through dicta.272
The Tenth Circuit then went on to explain why expanded judicial review
would undermine the independence of the arbitration system through practical
consideration. First, for awards to be effective, courts must first enforce the
arbitration agreements and then enforce the awards resulting from the
arbitration.273 Next, the court stated that applying expanded standards of
judicial review would put a court in the untenable position of having to review
proceedings that may have been guided by “unfamiliar rules and procedures,”
which parties are not permitted to do.274 The court gave another reason why
the independence of arbitration would be threatened by expanded review and,
therefore, would blur the distinction between arbitration and litigation.
Arbitrators are chosen for their ability to create innovative remedies, but
expanded review would force courts to review “that which it would not do,”
and would reduce an arbitrator’s eagerness to sculpt customized solutions “for
fear the decision will be vacated by a reviewing court.”275 The court held that
parties are not permitted to contract for expanded review of awards beyond the
grounds set forth in the FAA and judicially crafted standards, but that they
could contract for an appellate arbitration panel as the Seventh Circuit
suggested.276
The strength of the Bowen opinion lies in its ability to balance the variety
of interests involved in the issue of expanded judicial review of arbitration
awards: the parties, the courts and the arbitration system in general. The Tenth
Circuit is on strong footing in finding that the FAA’s limited grounds of review
are as significant as the Act’s instruction to courts to enforce arbitration
agreements since these limited grounds ensure “that the outcome of arbitration
would be as binding and as unassailable as the promise to participate in the
[arbitration] process.”277 The court’s fear that expanded review of arbitration
awards would threaten the independence of the arbitration process is on
equally solid ground because of the dangers of arbitration becoming entangled
in the process of litigation. As Professor Hans Smit has so ably stated:

272. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936-37.
273. Id. at 935.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 936.
276. Id. at 936-37 (citing Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,
935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991)).
277. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law,
70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1950 (1996).
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Exclusion of judicial review of arbitral awards for errors of fact or law is one
of the foundations on which the social desirability . . . of arbitration is firmly
built. For if arbitral awards could be reviewed for errors of law or fact,
arbitration would easily degenerate into a device for adding still another
instance to the usual three instances of litigation in ordinary courts. It is
exactly to avoid this socially most reprehensible consequence that the law
straightforwardly excludes review of arbitral awards for errors of fact or
law. . . . [T]his would not be the case if arbitration created merely a
preliminary instance to ordinary court proceedings.278

2.

Cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits

The Seventh Circuit weighed in on the issue of expanded review through
Chicago Typographical Union, where Judge Posner stated:
An agreement to submit a dispute over the interpretation of a . . . contract to
arbitration is a contractual commitment to abide by the arbitrator’s
interpretation. If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration
panel to review the arbitrator’s award. But they cannot contract for judicial
review of that award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.279

In LaPine, the majority opinion criticized this statement almost to the point of
incredulity by saying the Seventh Circuit failed to explain its reasoning and felt
“the court’s cryptic assertion about jurisdiction [was] dicta.”280 The LaPine
court further criticized the Seventh Circuit’s stance on jurisdiction by claiming
that the FAA was not a jurisdiction granting statute, but a regulation of
commerce.281 Yet Chicago Typographical was not a case asserting any rights
under the Act, but was a dispute over labor arbitration.282 When faced with the
union’s challenge of an arbitration award, the Seventh Circuit replied:
Federal courts do not review the soundness of arbitration awards . . . [The
arbitrator’s] interpretation of the contract binds the court asked to enforce the
award or to set it aside. The court is forbidden to substitute its own
interpretation even if convinced that the arbitrator’s interpretation was not only
wrong, but plainly wrong.283

278. Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 149 (1997).
279. Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1505.
280. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1997).
281. Id.
282. Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1503. In this case, the Sun-Times unilaterally
changed some terms of the union’s collective bargaining agreement, which led to the union filing
a grievance submitted to arbitration. Id. The arbitrator found that some of the changes were
warranted by the agreement and that others were not, but the union persisted and filed a lawsuit
challenging the arbitration award. Id.
283. Id. at 1505.
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Hence, the language in Chicago Typographical was directed at an argument
made by the union and, while dicta, was a strong argument against allowing
expanded judicial review through the parties’ fiat. The Bowen court cited
Chicago Typographical mainly for the language suggesting that parties who
agree to have expanded review should, instead, contract for an appellate
arbitration board. However, in a footnote, Bowen sheds light on this
jurisdictional issue by recognizing the dilemma courts would face in having to
vacate awards that courts would not usually vacate under federal statutory or
common law.284 The Bowen court then avoided deciding the jurisdictional
issue by holding parties cannot interfere with the judicial process.285
More recent decisions by the Seventh Circuit have further illustrated that
Circuit’s unwillingness to allow expanded judicial review of awards.286
Perhaps the strongest indication of how the Seventh Circuit would rule if faced
with a clause expanding judicial review is found in Bavarati v. Josephthal,
Lyon & Ross, Inc., in which Judge Posner declared:
Judicial review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it ought not be
called “review” at all. By including an arbitration clause in their contract the
parties agree to submit disputes arising out of the contract to a nonjudicial
forum, and we do not allow the disappointed party to bring his dispute into
court by the back door, arguing that he is entitled to appellate review of the
arbitrators’ decision.287

It is, therefore, safe to say that the Seventh Circuit would limit review of
arbitration awards to the grounds found in the FAA and the judicially-created
exceptions.
Support for rejecting the party-created, expanded standards for judicial
review can also be found in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in UHC Management
Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp.288 In this case, the losing party at arbitration

284. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 n.8 (10th Cir. 2001).
285. Id. at 937.
286. See, e.g., Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have
repeatedly held that 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides the exclusive grounds for setting aside an
arbitration award under the FAA.”); DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher
Corp., 14 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1994) (“One of the big differences between arbitration and
adjudication is that unless the parties provide otherwise, an arbitrator’s award is not appealable.
It is, however, subject to limited judicial review.”).
287. Bavarati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
288. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998). Strong language by the Eighth Circuit against expanded
judicial review can also be found in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., in which the
court stated:
an arbitrator’s conclusions on substantive matters may be vacated only when the
award demonstrates a manifest disregard of the law where the arbitrators correctly state
the law and then proceed to disregard it, if the award is otherwise irrational, or if any of
the explicit grounds for vacation or modification set forth in sections 10 and 11 of the Act
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claimed that the term in the arbitration clause saying arbitrators would be
“bound by controlling law” meant that the parties had agreed to expanded
judicial review of the award.289 In response to this claim, the court held it is
murky as to whether parties have input into the way “a federal court will
review an arbitration award when Congress has ordained a specific, selflimiting procedure for how such review is to occur.”290 The Eighth Circuit
then stated that section 9 of the FAA is a Congressional command to courts to
confirm an award when the grounds in sections 10 and 11 of the Act do not
apply.291 The court went on to doubt whether parties may agree to force a
federal court to ignore the FAA, citing the dissent in LaPine as support and
raising its concerns over possible harm that expanded review could have on the
integrity of the courts and the arbitration process.292 However, the court
warned it would reserve its judgment on this subject because the parties’
arbitration agreement did not clearly express the intent to have an expanded
standard applied.293
The statement of the Eighth Circuit that it would wait until it sees a clause
expressly expanding review of awards to rule on its enforceability seems to
bring the above quoted passages into the realm of obiter dictum. However, this
may not weaken the strength of the court’s analysis. The court could have
simply started off with its analysis that the clause did not show the parties’
intent, found it was unclear, and disposed of the case. Instead, the court
handed down a strong statutory and policy based argument, albeit with guarded
language, against expanded review. The court’s intent may have been that, in
not wanting to rock the boat by expressly disagreeing with Gateway
Technologies and LaPine, it was sending a message to parties in the Eighth
Circuit that if they attempted to contract for expanded judicial review they
would have a difficult time convincing the court.
V. WHY REJECTION OF EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AWARDS IS THE
CORRECT APPROACH
While this section of the Comment may take several turns, or even detours,
it will attempt to stay on the road to show that allowing parties to expand
judicial review of awards by agreement is unacceptable for two broad reasons.
are present. . . . These grounds have often been deemed the exclusive grounds for vacation
or modification.
783 F.2d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
289. UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997.
290. Id.
291. Id. The pertinent clause of § 9 states: “[T]he court must grant such an order [of
confirmation] unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and
11 of this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
292. UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997-98.
293. Id. at 998.
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First, it will threaten the integrity of the arbitration process because of
additional costs and time, and will lead to arbitration becoming another form of
adjudication rather than the alternative to litigation that it is supposed to be.
Second, parties cannot alter the federal court process or create federal
jurisdiction solely by their contract without Congress stating that they may do
so.
A.

Endangering the Integrity of the Arbitration Process

In 1965, Professor Martin Domke, the eminent scholar of arbitration,
wrote:
Courts do not wish to reopen an arbitration proceeding in another forum, by
reviewing the merits of an award. Such a review would lead to a second
proceeding with legal technicalities that the parties intended to avoid. It would
substitute the court’s judgment for that of the arbitrators and destroy the very
aim of arbitration, which is to have a speedy determination of the issues
submitted to experts in whom the parties had expressed confidence.294

This passage still rings true today. Expanded judicial review frustrates the
whole process of arbitration to the extent that arbitration would no longer look
like arbitration at all. A long-standing platitude of arbitration is that parties
agreeing to settle their dispute by arbitration enter into a quid pro quo: a
limited right of appeal of the award in exchange for a cheap and quick
resolution of the dispute.295 Therefore, expanded judicial review would wreck
the advantages of arbitration by adding costs and delay. A powerful reason for
allowing judicial review only under the limited aspects of the FAA is that
parties will receive a resolution in a “speedy and efficient manner.”296
Consider, for instance, the dispute in LaPine. The arbitration award was
entered in August 1994 and the motion to vacate was filed in November of the
same year.297 The district court denied this motion thirteen months later in
December 1995.298 The appellate decision, which reversed and remanded to
the district court, was handed down in December 1997, almost two years to the
day after the district court decision.299 If the parties did not settle and the case
went back to the district court on remand, it would be safe to assume that it
would take another year for the district court to decide the case. Taking this
line of reasoning a step further, if the district court vacated the award and
ordered a new arbitration, where would the parties be? They would have spent
five years of their time on the dispute, spent an untold amount of money on

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 99 (1965).
Younger, supra note 190, at 241.
Smit, supra note 278, at 147.
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1997).
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
LaPine, 130 F.3d at 884.
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court fees and attorneys and they would not be one iota closer to a resolution.
In fact, due to the added time and expense, the parties would have been better
off filing suit in a court of law rather than seeking arbitration under their
expanded standard.300
The fact that arbitration has made headway into many areas of the law
means that more and more people and businesses are affected by the process.
The consumer, employee or small business may sign an arbitration agreement
unwittingly or with the knowledge that the party with superior bargaining
power (manufacturer, employer, large company) could simply walk away if the
weaker party did not agree to its terms.301 It would be a manifest injustice to
then make the process that the weaker party agrees to more expensive with the
specter of expanded judicial review hanging above the process. Not only was
Congress concerned with providing a cheaper and quicker means of dispute
resolution in 1925,302 but today Congress is still concerned with providing
parties, especially employees and consumers, the great benefits of
arbitration.303
An example of how beneficial arbitration can be to an individual is in the
area of employment disputes—an aspect of the law that cuts across all classes.
A conservative average of the length of civil cases is two and one-half years
(with some taking as long as eight years) with the length only expected to grow
in our litigious system.304 By contrast, the average time for resolution of
arbitration cases is 8.6 months.305 In litigating an employment dispute, the
costs are at a minimum $10,000 even if the case does not go to trial, but if the
case is fully adjudicated the cost rises to a minimum of $50,000.306 Although
300. See Younger, supra note 190, at 261-62.
301. See Carbonneau, supra note 277, at 1956.
302. See Allied Bruce-Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (“We agree that
Congress, when enacting [the FAA], had the needs of customers, as well as others, in mind . . .
Indeed, arbitration’s advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining about
a product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation.”).
303. In the debate over The Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, Senator
Sessions said:
Arbitration is one the best means of dispute resolution and one that most consumers
and employees can afford. Consumers and employees generally cannot afford a team of
lawyers to represent them. And their claims are often not big enough so that a lawyer
would take the case on a . . . contingent fee. . . . If [the consumer or employee] can afford
to pay the [attorney’s] hourly rate, he must decide whether it makes financial sense to pay
a lawyer several thousand dollars to litigate a claim in court for a broken television that
cost $700 new. If this is what consumers and employees are left with, many will have no
choice but to drop their claim. This is not right. It is not fair.
146 CONG. REC. S10624 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2000) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
304. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 55 (1998).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 56.
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there is no definitive study of employment arbitration costs, one study posits
that costs could be as low as $3,000.307 Consequently, allowing expanded
review in this area would completely erase the time and money saved by an
employee wishing to settle his dispute by arbitration.
Since arbitration is faster, more cost effective and more definite than
litigation, more parties are able to seek justice by utilizing arbitration than they
would in the world of litigation.308 Expanding judicial review would add
“another tier to the time-consuming litigation process, rather than avoiding that
process.”309 American Arbitration Association Consumer Rules require smallclaim consumers to pay no filing fee and only a nominal $125 fee to the
arbitrator with the businesses paying the remainder of the costs.310 This
advantage would be eliminated if that company could then appeal an award
and force the matter into court. Further studies show that arbitration when the
amount in controversy is less than $50,000 takes, on average, six months from
the filing to the rendering of an award.311 Furthermore, by submitting the
claim to arbitration the parties gain access to a resolution process much faster
than in litigation with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) reporting
that the time for resolution averages about 110 days from the date of
submission.312
The Supreme Court has supported the premise that Congress intended
arbitration to be a quick process not subject to the delay inherent in the court
system.313 One study shows that in the period between 1960 and 1994 filings
in federal district courts rose 216% while filings in courts of appeals rose an
astounding 1,139%.314 Since arbitration is less expensive than litigation,
parties are free to spend the money saved on “more socially productive
purposes” and arbitration helps the judiciary by lightening its load of cases and

307. Id. at 54-55.
308. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 678 (1996).
309. Younger, supra note 190, at 261.
310. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 95 (2000) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
311. Allied Bruce-Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 280, 280-81 (1995). See also Tom
Arnold, Booby Traps in Arbitration Practice and How to Avoid Them, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY, Mar. 19, 1998, at 104.
312. THOMAS E. CROWLEY, SETTLE IT OUT OF COURT 171 (1994).
313. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (“We not
only honor the plain meaning of the [FAA] but also the unmistakably clear congressional purpose
that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not
subject to delay . . . .”).
314. Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25 (1996).
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freeing judicial resources for concentration on fewer cases.315 The time saving
aspects and cost-effectiveness of arbitration cherished by parties and the legal
community would evaporate with expanded judicial review of arbitration
awards.316
Besides ruining arbitration’s advantage over litigation in costs and time,
expanded judicial review would also compromise the integrity of the
arbitration system by taking away traditional advantages of arbitration: parties
choosing an expert as arbitrator, the awarding of alternative remedies that
courts cannot usually grant, and the lack of a need for a written opinion or
discovery. The Bowen court stated: “Arbitrators are chosen for their
specialized experience and knowledge, which enable them to fashion creative
remedies and solutions that courts may be less likely to endorse.”317 If
arbitration was subject to expanded judicial review for errors of law or fact, the
arbitrator would most likely have to be a lawyer (which is not always the case)
because the district court reviewing the award would certainly need an
extensive record to make a fair and informed adjudication. Therefore, the
arbitrator and parties would have to make sure that an extensive record exists,
which could only be accomplished through discovery, and a written and
reasoned award granted. These requirements would add cost and, more
importantly, would blur the line between arbitration and litigation. Also, and
more significantly, “arbitrators faced with heightened judicial scrutiny might
ultimately come to focus less on the merits of the particular dispute, or the
relationship between the parties, and more on the task of producing opinions or
building a record that would enable their awards to survive later challenge.”318
One of the main disadvantages of litigation is that it sometimes fails to
render a decision within the standards of the business involved; therefore,
resolution by a party with expertise in the area of dispute “is one of the greatest
advantages of arbitration.”319 In addition, an arbitrator chosen for his
315. Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255 (1987).
316. See BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT
COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1990) (providing an example of how lawyers, parties, and
judges value arbitration). In this extensive study of arbitration programs in federal courts, 60% of
lawyers felt the arbitration program saved them time, 62% felt that it saved costs, and 65% felt
the arbitration saved time for their clients. Id. at 85. Sixty-five percent of parties agreed that the
costs were reasonable, while 71% agreed that personal time requirements were reasonable. Id. at
89-92 tbls.26-27. Ninety-six percent of judges described their level of support for the program as
“very positive” (78.9%) or “somewhat positive” (17.5%). Id. at 112 tbl.33. Perhaps most
significant is that almost 97% of the judges surveyed agreed that the arbitration program reduced
their caseload burden. Id. at 115 tbl.36.
317. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001).
318. MURRAY, supra note 100, at 623.
319. Tom Cullinan, Note, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in
Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395, 424 (1998).
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knowledge and experience in the area “will know more about the disputed
subject than ordinary judges or juries” thereby giving parties more confidence
in the award handed down.320 As stated above, if an arbitrator has to worry
about ensuring that her award will not be overturned by spending more time
preserving a record or refereeing discovery, then her focus will be shifted away
from the task she has to complete—coming to a just and efficient resolution of
the dispute.
The flexibility of arbitration allows an arbitrator to come up with a more
equitable solution to the dispute.321 Instead of “promoting enlightened
development of the law” through arbitration’s specially crafted solutions,
expanded judicial review would deter arbitrators from crafting “reasonable
solutions if they had to worry that courts might not be willing or able to
endorse the legal bases on which they rest.”322
The expanded standard of judicial review is also unsettling due to the fact
that a court may be asked to review an award without a complete record or
arbitrator opinion, which could put the court in the untenable position of
appearing to be an “unprincipled decisionmaker” and damaging its integrity.323
An extensive record could solve this with an opinion fueled by discovery, but
again cost considerations would arise thereby making arbitration a less
attractive form of dispute resolution.
Traditionally, except in labor and international arbitrations, arbitrators
rarely issue opinions, but render awards that may just state who won and what
remedies were granted to the prevailing party.324 Furthermore, arbitrators are
not required to explain the reasoning behind their awards.325 Stare decisis or
precedent does not apply to arbitrators without party agreement, so arbitrators
can inject their own notions of justice as long as this does not result in a party

320. Kanowitz, supra note 315, at 255.
321. DOMKE, supra note 294, at 11.
322. Smit, supra note 277, at 152.
323. Cole, supra note 29, at 1259.
324. Marc S. Dobin, Appealing the Unappealable: Vacating Arbitration Awards, THE BRIEF,
Fall 1996, at 69. For examples of what forms arbitration awards can take, see JAY E. GRENIG,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WITH FORMS 461-63 (2d ed. 1996). But see Josef Rohlik,
Arbitrators Should Write Opinions for Parties and for Courts, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 933, 940
(2000), for examples of how the absence of an arbitrator opinion can result in vacatur of awards.
325. See, e.g., Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994)
(“[A]n arbitrator is simply not required to state the reasons for his decision . . . Such a
requirement would serve only to perpetuate the delay and expense which arbitration is meant to
combat.”); In re Sobel, 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Obviously, a requirement that
arbitrators explain their reasoning in every case would help to uncover egregious failures to apply
the law to an arbitrated dispute. But such a rule would undermine the very purpose of arbitration,
which is to provide a relatively quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute
settlement.”).
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being treated unfairly.326 One of the pitfalls of litigation that leads to it
becoming expensive is that parties take great pains to secure a complete record
for any appeal that could follow.327 Therefore, parties in an arbitration with
expanded judicial review will do the same thing, leading to additional costs
like a stenographer, written opinion (arbitrators charge by the hour sometimes),
or lawyers obsessing over technicalities resulting in the arbitration becoming
nothing more than a step in the ladder of litigation.
Courts recognize that a major distinction between litigation and arbitration
is that the latter does not require discovery and reject arbitral discovery
because it “is generally regarded as inconsistent with arbitration’s goal of
speed, efficiency and reduced cost.”328 With the requirement of a complete
record for judicial review, heightened discovery would be required in the
arbitration process. Delay and inefficiency could arise in arbitration because
many arbitrators are not lawyers and do not have the legal training essential to
conduct the complicated process of discovery.329
The greatest danger is that enforcing parties’ agreements that expand
judicial review of arbitration will hurt the integrity of the process by making
arbitration just another rung in the ladder of federal court adjudication.
Arbitration is an act of self-governance by which the parties choose their own
judge, set their own rules and avoid the trappings of litigation like costs and
delay by keeping the government out of their dispute.330 Expanded review
would bring the courts back into the process beyond the limited functions they
perform under the FAA and cause a “flood of appeals” tossing arbitration “into
a litigation-like quagmire.”331 Adhering to the limited review in the FAA
keeps the integrity of arbitration intact for two reasons: first, expanded judicial
review would lead to arbitration becoming “a mere-stepping stone to
litigation”332 and, second, a process allowing a “‘second bite at the apple’
would do little to establish the faith and confidence that any system of dispute
resolution requires.”333 Allowing expanded review for errors of fact or law
would transform arbitration into “a preliminary step to litigation, a mere
advisory process, or simply a private trial court whose awards will be reviewed
326. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 79, at 6-9.
327. Younger, supra note 190, at 248.
328. Mary A. Bedikian, Discovery in Arbitration, in ARBITRATION & THE LAW 1993-94:
AAA GENERAL COUNSEL’S ANNUAL REPORT 24 (1994).
329. Wendy Ho, Comment, Discovery in Commercial Arbitration Proceedings, 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 199, 220-21 (1997).
330. Davis, supra note 84, at 130-31.
331. Id. at 132.
332. Cullinan, supra note 319, at 397. See also Younger, supra note 190, at 261 (“Contractual
expansion of judicial review may thus simply add another tier to the time-consuming litigation
process, rather than avoiding that process.”).
333. Cullinan, supra note 319, at 398. See also Carbonneau, supra note 277, at 1958 (“[Y]ou
get only one bite at the apple in arbitration, and the result is only as good as your arbitrator.”).
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by an appellate [judge].”334 Allowing arbitration to become just a step towards
litigation cannot be what Congress or the Supreme Court intended by giving
parties the opportunity, through their agreement, to mold their own procedures
for dispute resolution.
B.

Parties Cannot Alter the Judicial Process

The Supreme Court has stated that the FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at
English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”335 Enforcing
an agreement expanding judicial review is not sanctioned by the FAA and
could initiate a resurrection of the judiciary’s “historical anti-arbitration
sentiment. . . .”336 In addition, the FAA was meant to guarantee the
enforcement of arbitration agreements just like other contracts, but it would be
incredulous to think that Congress intended that arbitration agreements could
direct a court how to conduct itself. There is no precedent of the Supreme
Court that can be cited to support the proposition that parties may contractually
dictate to courts how they must decide disputes. The Supreme Court cases
interpreting the FAA give parties free range on formation of arbitration
agreements,337 but mention nothing about contracting as to how a federal court
must review the arbitration award. As Judge Mayer so aptly put it in his
LaPine dissent: “Kyocera cites no authority explicitly empowering litigants to
dictate how an Article III court must review an arbitration decision. Absent
this, they may not.”338
The Supreme Court has given great deference to what parties contract for
beyond the cases examined in Part III of this Comment. In M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Court held that the parties’ forum selection clause
choosing the High Court in London as the forum for the dispute should be
honored and that the claim that enforcing the clause would “oust” the federal
courts of jurisdiction was a legal fiction.339 Similarly, in Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Court upheld a forum selection clause against a party

334. Olivier Antione, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 23, 24 (Aug.
1999).
335. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
336. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 114, at 250-51.
337. See generally Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (upholding a choice of law provision); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (holding the Court had to enforce a clause that excluded
punitive damages); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220-21(1985) (upholding
an agreement even if it would result in bifurcation).
338. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
339. 407 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1972).
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claim that the forum was inconvenient and unfair.340 Nevertheless, both of
these cases involve a federal court divesting itself of the case in deference to
the parties’ agreements while the expanded judicial review would require a
federal court to enter judgment on a matter it could not have ruled on absent
the agreement. Thus, courts allowing parties to contract for expanded review
of awards would mean one of two things: that the parties have the power to
dictate how the judiciary operates or that the court can be utilized by parties as
a kind of super-arbitrator.
There is no doubt that parties possess the freedom to sculpt their arbitration
process as they see fit. Yet the key word is “process,” meaning the parties
decide how the procedure of their arbitration is run. Contracting for expanded
review involves the parties attempting to dictate how the judicial process must
be run. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated: “Section 10 [of
the FAA] sets forth a restricted list of grounds on which a court may entertain a
motion to vacate an award; those grounds are directed primarily to
fundamental errors within the arbitration process itself (for instance, fraud,
misconduct) . . . .”341 Parties may direct the procedure of the arbitration, but
cannot contract for how a court decides the substantive issue of whether
vacatur is appropriate.
Professor Alan Scott Rau “see[s] the provisions of § 10 [of the Act], not as
an imperative command of public policy, but as no more than a set of ‘default
rules’ intended to reflect the traditional historical understanding concerning the
binding effect of arbitral awards.”342 However, there is no language in the
FAA indicating that its provisions are “default rules,” that parties may
supplement the sections of the Act by contract, or that parties are free to ignore
the grounds for vacatur set forth in section 10 if they please to do so.
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution states: “The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”343 Article
I gives Congress the power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court.”344 Article III, Section 2 provides a list of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction.345 Professor John Leubsdorf wrote: “The article III courts . . .

340. 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991). The plaintiffs, in Shute, filed suit in district court in
Washington against the cruiseline claiming its negligence caused their injuries, but the contract
the plaintiffs signed clearly stated that any disputes would be heard before a court in Florida (the
cruiseline’s primary place of business). Id. at 588.
341. Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6, 8 (1st
Cir. 2001).
342. Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 231
(1997).
343. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
344. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
345. Id. art. III, § 2.
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limit the powers of Congress and the President by construing statutes and
judging the constitutionality of legislative and executive action.”346 Courts
following the directives of parties in reviewing awards would, in fact, be
misconstruing the FAA without declaring it unconstitutional.
Nowhere in the Constitution did the framers say private parties could
create jurisdiction or dictate judicial power. In American Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Finn, the Supreme Court stated: “The jurisdiction of the federal courts is
carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation or by prior action
or consent of the parties.”347 In Community Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor, the Supreme Court elaborated this point by stating that “the parties by
consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the
limitations imposed by Article III . . . When these Article III limitations are at
issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the
limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to
protect.”348 Courts and parties adopting the party-driven expansion of review
of awards would be in conflict with the Supreme Court because the courts
would be deciding cases that they would not normally have the power to
decide.
However, the FAA is not a jurisdictional statute and an independent
ground for jurisdiction must be present for parties to take advantage of the
FAA. Judge Posner, in Chicago Typographical, stated: “federal jurisdiction
cannot be created by contract.”349 The LaPine court attempted to refute this
statement by claiming “that the FAA is a regulation of commerce rather than a
limitation on or conferral of federal court jurisdiction.”350 Beyond the fact that
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA appear to be a limitation on the judiciary’s
power to vacate or modify an arbitration award, the question must be asked as
to how can Congress effectuate its power to regulate commerce? The simple
answer is by giving courts jurisdiction to enforce the policies of its legislation.
When parties begin to impose their own standards on the courts, they are
usurping the power granted exclusively to Congress, even more so when
Congress has already definitively spoken on the subject as it has concerning
arbitration.
One scholar went as far as to state that if courts did enforce parties’
agreements to expand judicial review beyond the FAA, the court would be

346. John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. REV. 181, 196 (1987).
347. 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951).
348. 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
349. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505
(7th Cir. 1991).
350. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1997).
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ignoring Congress and violating the separation of powers doctrine.351 To allow
this would be a dangerous precedent, indeed. The Supreme Court has stated:
“Some [problems] will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by
looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will
effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined
by the nature of the problem.”352 No inventiveness is needed for the problem
of vacating arbitration awards since there already is an express Congressional
directive which controls—the FAA.
While not as onerous as the above constitutional implications, a court
acting as a super-arbitrator is not permissible. Under expanded review, courts
would be acting as the parties’ arbitrator of last resort because, if the parties’
agreements must be followed exactly according to their terms, the court should
have to conduct its review under any rules or laws that the parties had agreed
upon. This would put the court into “the awkward position of reviewing
proceedings conducted under potentially unfamiliar rules and procedures.”353
The court is not required to denigrate itself in this manner by blurring the
distinct lines between arbitration and adjudication. At least one Circuit Court
of Appeals has ruled that any federal judge or magistrate may not act as an
arbitrator. In what Judge Posner described as a “procedurally remarkable
case,” the parties in DDI Seamless Cylinder v. General Fire Extinguisher
Corp. asked a federal magistrate who was assigned their case to act as
arbitrator for them and he agreed to fill that role.354 To avoid having to subject
the magistrate judge’s decision under the strict review of the FAA and thus
avoid the discomfort of one judge confirming or vacating the award of another,
the court characterized the situation as a case of the magistrate and parties
agreeing to a shortened procedure “rather than an unauthorized arbitral one.”355
When parties contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards,
they are, in effect, asking the federal district court to act as a super-arbitrator,
not a judge. Only when parties petition for confirmation, vacatur, or
modification are they seeking an order permitted by federal law. By agreeing
to review the award under the standard of expanded review, the judge has
taken off his “judge’s hat” and put on his “arbitrator’s hat”356 since there is no
statutory basis allowing the judge to review the cases in the manner dictated by
the parties.

351. McCartney, supra note 145, at 162. See also Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 114, at 248
(“Courts should not expand the grounds of vacatur of an arbitration award because such
expansion is beyond the power Congress granted to the court.”).
352. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
353. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001).
354. 14 F.3d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1994).
355. Id. at 1168.
356. Id. at 1165-66.
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One last argument not addressed by the courts against permitting expanded
judicial review of arbitration awards is that arbitration with this new standard
for vacatur would no longer be arbitration at all. An arbitration clause, in
effect, ousts the court of its jurisdiction357 and allows the arbitrator to resolve
the dispute independently. An arbitration agreement expanding judicial review
beyond the grounds set forth in section 10 of the FAA would not oust the court
of its jurisdiction, but would permit the dispute to get into court through the
back door. Therefore, it can be argued that a clause expanding review would
be unenforceable as a result. A court could easily invalidate the entire
arbitration agreement, or the expanding clause, because the agreement would
be self-contradictory. On one hand, contracting for dispute resolution through
arbitration and, on the other hand, ultimately calling upon the court system to
give the final word on the resolution of the dispute.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment does not refute that arbitration is a process operated
pursuant to the wishes or whims of the parties who contracted for arbitration.
Parties are free to contract as to what law will govern their arbitration, who
will hear their controversy, where the arbitration will be held, and the list goes
on and on. Yet a court reviewing an arbitration award pursuant to expanded
judicial review created by the parties goes against the precise word of
Congress as laid down in the FAA. Once a decision is made and a party
wishes to have that award confirmed or vacated in federal court, to paraphrase
President Harry S. Truman, the buck stops there. The party is then invoking
federal jurisdiction under the FAA and courts should be obliged to follow what
Congress enacted, not what the parties contracted. As the Supreme Court in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon stated: “Like any statutory
directive, the Arbitration Act mandate may be overridden by a contrary
congressional command.”358 Through the FAA, Congress “codified judicial
deference to the arbitration process . . . reflect[ing] congressional confidence in
the arbitration process to make the right decision in the large majority of cases
and to reduce the caseload in federal courts.”359 Furthermore, allowing
expanded judicial review through freedom of contract principles is a
reactionary exercise reviving the “judicial hostility towards arbitration that the
FAA sought to remedy.”360

357. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 987 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2nd Cir. 1942)).
358. 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
359. Michael G. Munsell, Scope of Review for Orders Confirming, Vacating, or Modifying
Ambitral Awards: An End to Deferential Standards, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 222 (1996) [sic].
360. Curtin, supra note 115, at 368.
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There are several alternatives to a flat out rejection of expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards. First, Congress could follow the lead of states
like New Jersey and amend section 10(a) of the Act to permit vacatur for errors
of law or fact.361 Second, parties could follow Judge Posner’s advice in
Chicago Typographical and “contract for an appellate arbitration panel to
review the arbitrator’s award.”362 This would allow parties to avoid having to
enter the federal court system, hence avoiding added costs and delay, and
permit the parties to still control the scope of review and who would conduct
the review. Third, if parties are concerned with the possibility of an arbitrator
applying the law incorrectly, they can make sure the arbitrators they select are
competent, establish unambiguous criteria for how the arbitration shall be
conducted, limit the damages or remedies that an arbitrator can award, and
obligate the arbitrator to provide his reasoning for the award thereby avoiding
the hazard that a court may not enforce an expanded review of the award.363
Since expanded judicial review of awards would lead to an assault on the
integrity and effectiveness of the arbitration process and because there is no
basis for allowing parties to alter the federal court process by agreement,
Bowen should be viewed as the correct approach in denying parties this
awesome power, which they granted to themselves. Allowing party-created,
expanded judicial review would harm the integrity of the courts by forcing
them to follow the directions of private citizens and making the clear line
separating arbitration and litigation disappear leading to arbitration becoming
just another step in the litigation process.
KEVIN A. SULLIVAN*

361. The New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-13(c)(5) (West 2000), provides, in
part:
c. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party . . . if the court finds that
the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(5) The [arbitrator’s] committing prejudicial error by erroneously applying law to the
issues and facts presented for alternative resolution.
362. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505
(7th Cir. 1991).
363. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS
USERS 277 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001).
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